ΣΥΝΕΡΓΑΣΙΕΣ- ΑΠΟΖΗΜΕΙΩΣΕΙΣ–ΠΑΝ ΟΥΣΙΑ

A)Γιατί η αλλαγή πορείας απαιτεί ευρύτερες συνεργασίες κι όχι αυτοδυναμία

Η μόνη περίπτωση για να αλλάξει η πορεία της χώρας προς προοδευτική, οικολογική και δημοκρατική κατεύθυνση είναι η συνεργασία «ΠΡΑΣΙΝΟΙ-ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ» να εκπροσωπηθεί στη Βουλή με ισχυρή εκλογική δύναμη και να συμβάλει στην διαμόρφωση μιας προοδευτικής διακυβέρνησης στη βάση  προγραμματικής συμφωνίας και ενός εναλλακτικού ρεαλιστικού και ταυτόχρονα οραματικού σχεδίου.

Με ευθύνη του εκλογικού νόμου αλλά και του συνόλου των πολιτικών κομμάτων που δεν άλλαξαν τον εκλογικό νόμο, η αυτοδυναμία βασίζεται σε υφαρπαγή της βούλησης των πολιτών. Ο εκλογικός νόμος χαρίζει 50 έδρες στον νικητή ακόμη κι αν κερδίσει τον δεύτερο με μόνο μία ψήφο διαφορά. Μια τέτοια αυτοδυναμία δεν είναι επιθυμητή γιατί δεν θα εκφράζει μια ευρύτερη κοινωνική και πολιτική προγραμματική συμφωνία για αλλαγή πορείας.

Ο πήχης που εξασφαλίζει τις 151+ έδρες εξαρτάται αποκλειστικά και μόνον από το ποσοστό που θα συγκεντρώσουν τα πολύ μικρά κόμματα που δεν θα μπουν στη Βουλή (αυτά με κάτω του 3%). Όσο μεγαλύτερο είναι το συνολικό ποσοστό των μικρών αυτών κομμάτων, τόσο ο πήχης της αυτοδυναμίας υποχωρεί από το 39% προς το 36%, ενώ μπορεί να φτάσει ακόμη πιο κάτω, αν τα λεγόμενα «λοιπά κόμματα» αθροίσουν πάνω από 11%. Στους δύσκολους καιρούς που ζουμε μια αυτοδυναμία του 35% θα είναι ασταθής.

Ιδιαίτερα ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ που όπως φαίνεται θα έχει, με ασφάλεια, την πρώτη θέση, θα βρεθεί – με βάση όσα λέει – χωρίς συμμάχους για σχηματισμό μιας σοβαρής κυβέρνησης που θα πρέπει να προωθήσει βαθιές αλλά ρεαλιστικές και οραματικές αλλαγές. Θα είναι στα αλήθεια σοβαρή μια κυβέρνηση ΣΥΡΙΖΑ-ΑΝΕΛ; Μπορεί ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ να συνεργαστεί με το ΠΑΣΟΚ του Βενιζέλου ή με το ΚΙΔΗΣΟ του Γ. Παπανδρέου; Μπορεί να σχηματίσει κυβέρνηση από κοινού με τον Σταύρο Θεοδωράκη κι αν ναι στη βάση ποιου προγράμματος;

Εκ των πραγμάτων, η πορεία αλλαγής των πολιτικών αλλά και ο σχηματισμός μιας αξιόπιστης νέας διακυβέρνησης πρέπει να βασίζεται σε σχέδιο οικολογικό, οικονομικά και κοινωνικά καινοτόμο με την στήριξη ευρύτερων συμμαχιών σε Ελλάδα και Ευρώπη.

Οι «ΠΡΑΣΙΝΟΙ-ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ» οραματιζόμαστε μια άλλη Ελλάδα σε μια διαφορετική Ευρώπη. Αντιτασσόμαστε στην Ευρώπη των νεοφιλελεύθερων πολιτικών, με τη μονομέρεια της σιδηράς και, τελικά, κοινωνικά άδικης δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας, που τροφοδοτεί  την ανεργία και τις οικονομικές κοινωνικές ανισότητες. Αρνούμαστε όλα αυτά, που παγιώνουν το διαχωρισμό σε χώρες πλεονασμάτων και χώρες ελλειμμάτων και ενισχύουν τον ευρωσκεπτικισμό και την ακροδεξιά.

Αλλά η κριτική δεν αρκεί για να υπάρξει μετεκλογικά κυβερνητική συνεργασία κι αλλαγή πορείας.  Η άρνηση δεν συγκροτεί από μόνη της εναλλακτικό σχέδιο.

Δηλώνουμε παρόν στην πανευρωπαϊκή προσπάθεια για την μετατροπή της Ευρώπης από ήπειρο της λιτότητας και των ανισοτήτων, σε ήπειρο της βιώσιμης ευημερίας, της κοινωνικής συνοχής, της οικολογικά και κοινωνικά υπεύθυνης οικονομίας, της οικολογικής δικαιοσύνης, της αλληλεγγύης, της πλήρους απασχόλησης,  των ίσων ευκαιριών και της ολόπλευρης Δημοκρατίας.
Πιστεύουμε ότι  ως κοινωνία και χώρα χρειάζεται να συμμετάσχουμε σε συμμαχίες και αγώνες για την ενοποίηση της Ευρώπης, για να δημιουργηθεί πράγματι μια ευρωπαϊκή ομοσπονδία. Σε ένα τέτοιο ευρωπαϊκό πλαίσιο μπορούν να λυθούν τα άμεσα προβλήματα (χρέος, ανεργία, ρύπανση κα) και να αντιμετωπιστούν αποτελεσματικά ζητήματα που αφορούν στην ασφάλεια, στη βιωσιμότητα του συστήματος υγείας, στις συντάξεις, στην εγγύηση των καταθέσεων, στην αντιμετώπιση της φτώχειας  και στην προστασία του κλίματος.
Επιβάλλεται η ανασυγκρότηση της διοίκησης προς όφελος των πολιτών και του δημόσιου συμφέροντος, εκπαίδευση και αναβάθμιση των ικανοτήτων του προσωπικού στον δημόσιο και ιδιωτικό τομέα, μετακίνηση πλεονάζοντος προσωπικού από γραφειοκρατικές δομές σε κοινωνικές, περιβαλλοντικές υποδομές, που είναι σήμερα σχεδόν ανύπαρκτες ή παροχή κινήτρων για δημιουργία κοινωνικών συνεταιριστικών επιχειρήσεων και συνεργασία με τον δημόσιο τομέα στη βάση συμβάσεων κοινωνικής αναφοράς. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό θα ενισχύσουμε προσπάθειες μεταφοράς καλών πρακτικών κι ανταλλαγής εμπειριών μεταξύ αυτοδιοικητικών και επαγγελματικών φορέων από διάφορες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες.
Ως ευρωπαϊστές θέλουμε να αλλάξει η Ευρώπη και τα Κράτη-Μέλη να προωθούν μια εξωτερική πολιτική ασφάλειας που βασίζεται στο σεβασμό τους διεθνούς δικαίου και των διεθνών συνθηκών, των δίκαιων οικονομικών σχέσεων και της οικολογικής ισορροπίας. Υπερασπιζόμαστε την ειρηνική συνύπαρξη των λαών και την ειρηνική επίλυση των διαφορών.
Οι «ΠΡΑΣΙΝΟΙ-ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ» θέλουμε την Ελλάδα πρωτοπόρα στην ανάληψη δυναμικών πρωτοβουλιών στην ευρύτερη περιοχή για την ασφάλεια μέσα από το συνεργασία, τη σταθερότητα και την βιώσιμη ευημερία.
Απέναντι στις δυνάμεις του εθνικισμού, της εσωστρέφειας και της φοβίας αντιτάσσουμε την πολιτική του διαλόγου, της συνεργασίας και της ειρηνικής συνύπαρξης. Η άδικη κι αδιέξοδη κυβερνητική πολιτική δεν μπορεί να αντικατασταθεί από μια άστοχη κι αβέβαιη πολιτική αλλά από ένα αξιόπιστο, ισορροπημένο και κοινωνικά δίκαιο εναλλακτικό σχέδιο διεξόδου από την κρίση.
Οι «ΠΡΑΣΙΝΟΙ-ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ» θα επαναδιεκδικήσουμε τη θέση μας στην Ευρώπη και  στον κόσμο.
Έιμαστε εδώ!

* Ο Νίκος Χρυσόγελος είναι υποψήφιος βουλευτής Β’ Αθηνών με το ψηφοδέλτιο “ΠΡΑΣΙΝΟΙ-ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ”

PAGAN  http://tvxs.gr

 

B)Θα έπρεπε να είμαστε ευγνώμονες προς τους Έλληνες που δεν ζήτησαν πολεμικές αποζημιώσεις

Γερμανία, ο μεγαλύτερος αμαρτωλός χρεών του 20ου αιώνα («Deutscland ist der größte Schuldensünder des 20. Jahrhunderts»)

Συνέντευξη του Albrecht Ritsch , Wirtschaftshistoriker ( καθηγητή Ιστορίας της Οικονομίας) στο Spiegel.

Spiegel: Κυριε Ritschl η Γερμανία συζητάει αυτό τον καιρό για περαιτέρω οικονομική βοήθεια για την Ελλάδα σαν υπεράνω όλων ηθικολόγος. Η κυβέρνηση ενεργεί με ακαμψία σύμφωνα με τη ρήση : ¨λεφτά θα πάρετε μόνο αν κάνετε αυτό που σας λέμε¨. Είναι δίκαιη αυτή η συμπεριφορά

Ritschl: Οχι, είναι απολύτως αδικαιολόγητη….

Spiegel Μάλλον δεν το βλέπουν έτσι οι περισσότεροι Γερμανοί.

Ritschl Μπορεί, αλλά η Γερμανία έζησε τις μεγαλύτερες χρεοκοπίες της νεότερης ιστορίας. Τ ην σημερινή οικονομική ανεξαρτησία της και τη θέση της ως Διδασκάλου της Ευρώπης την χρωστάει στις ΗΠΑ, οι οποίες μετά τον 1ο αλλά και τον 2ο Παγκόσμιο πόλεμο παραιτήθηκαν από το δικαίωμα τους για τεράστια χρηματικά ποσά. Αυτό δεν το θυμάται όμως κανείς.

Spiegel Τι ακριβώς συνέβη τότε;

Ritschl Η δημοκρατία της Βαϊμάρης κατόρθωσε να επιζήσει από το 1924 μέχρι 1929 αποκλειστικά με δανεικά, τα δε χρήματα για τις αποζημιώσεις του 1. Παγκοσμιου πολέμου δανείστηκε από τις ΗΠΑ. Αυτη η ¨δανειακή Πυραμίδα¨ κατέρρευσε με την κρίση του 1931. Τ α χρήματα των δανείων των ΗΠΑ είχαν εξαφανιστεί, η ζημιά για τις ΗΠΑ τεράστια, οι συνέπειες για την παγκόσμια οικονομία καταστροφικές.

Spiegel Τ ο ίδιο και μετά τον 2ο Παγκόσμιο πόλεμο;

Ritschl Η Αμερική τότε φρόντισε να μην θέσει κανείς από τους συμμάχους αξιώσεις για αποζημίωση. Εκτός από μερικές εξαιρέσεις, ματαιώθηκαν όλες οι αξιώσεις μέχρι μια μελλοντική επανένωση των Γερμανιών (ανατολικής και δυτικής). Αυτό ήταν πολύ ζωτικό για την Γερμανία, ήταν στην ουσία η οικονομική βάση του γερμανικού μεταπολεμικού θαύματος. Αλλά παράλληλα, τα θύματα της γερμανικής κατοχής ήταν αναγκασμένα να αποποιηθούν τα δικαιώματα τους για αποζημίωση, μεταξύ αυτών και οι Έλληνες.

Spiegel Στη σημερινή κρίση παίρνει η Ελλάδα από Ευρώπη και ΔΝ Τ 110 δις και συζητιέται ένα πρόσθετο πακέτο, που θα είναι εξ ίσου μεγάλο. Πρόκειται δηλαδή για πολλά χρήματα. Πόσο μεγάλες ήταν οι γερμανικές χρεοκοπίες;

Ritschl Αναλογικά με την οικονομικη επιφανεια που είχαν οι ΗΠΑ κατά την εποχή εκείνη, τα γερμανικά χρέη της δεκαετίας του 30 ισοδυναμούν με το κόστος της κρίσης του 2008. Συγκριτικά, λοιπόν, τα χρέη της Ελλάδας είναι μηδαμινά.

Spiegel Αν υποθέταμε ότι υπήρχε μια παγκόσμια λίστα για βασιλιάδες της χρεοκοπίας, ποιά θα ήταν η θέση της Γερμανίας;

Ritschl Αυτοκρατορική. Σε σχέση με την οικονομική επιφάνεια της χώρας, η Γερμανία είναι ο μεγαλύτερος αμαρτωλός του 20ου αιώνα και πιθανόν της νεότερης οικονομικής ιστορίας.

Spiegel Ούτε η Ελλάδα δεν μπορεί να μας ανταγωνιστεί;

Ritschl Όχι, η Ελλάδα παίζει ένα δευτερεύοντα ρόλο. Υπάρχει, βέβαια, το πρόβλημα του κινδύνου της μετάδοσης της κρίσης στις γνωστές ευρωπαϊκές χώρες.

Spiegel Η ομοσπονδιακή δημοκρατία της Γερμανίας θεωρείται ως ενσάρκωση της σταθερότητας. Πόσες φορές έχει χρεοκοπήσει η Γερμανία;

Ritschl Εξαρτάται πως το υπολογίζει κανείς. Τ ον τελευταίο αιώνα τουλάχιστο τρεις φορές. Μετά την τελευταία στάση πληρωμών στη δεκαετία του 30, ανακουφίστηκε η Γερμάνια από τις ΗΠΑ με μια μείωση χρεών, η αλλιώς ένα „Haircut“, που ισοδυναμεί με ένα μεγαλόπρεπο Afro-Look που μετατρέπεται σε φαλάκρα. Από τότε κρατάει η χώρα την οικονομική λάμψη της, ενώ οι υπόλοιποι ευρωπαίοι δούλευαν σαν τα σκυλιά για να ορθοποδήσουν από τις καταστροφές του πολέμου και τη γερμανική κατοχή. Κι ακόμη το 1990 είχαμε επίσης μια στάση πληρωμών.

Spiegel Πως είπατε;

Ritschl Βεβαίως! Ο τότε καγκελάριος Kohl αρνήθηκε να υλοποιήσει τη Συμφωνία του Λονδίνου, του 1953. Η συμφωνία έλεγε ότι οι γερμανικές πολεμικές αποζημιώσεις στην περίπτωση της επανένωσης των Γερμανίων θα πρέπει να τεθούν υπό επαναδιαπραγμάτευση. Η Γερμάνια όμως δεν πλήρωσε αποζημιώσεις μετά το 1990 (εκτός πολύ λίγων) ούτε τα αναγκαστικά δανεια, ούτε τα έξοδα κατοχής. Η Ελλάδα είναι ένα από τα κράτη, που δεν πήραν δεκάρα.

Spiegel Σε αντίθεση με το 1953, συζητείται επί του παρόντος η διάσωση της Ελλάδας, λιγότερο μέσω μιας μείωσης των χρεών και περισσότερο μέσω μιας παράτασης του χρόνου πληρωμής των κρατικών ομολόγων, δηλαδή μιας ήπιας αναπροσαρμογής των χρεών. Μπορούμε εδώ να μιλάμε για επαπειλούμενη χρεοκοπία;

Ritschl Οπωσδήποτε. Ακόμη κι αν ενα κράτος δεν είναι εκατό τα εκατό ανίκανο να ικανοποιήσει τους πιστωτές του, μπορεί να είναι υπό χρεοκοπία. Ακριβώς όπως στην περίπτωση της Γερμανίας τη δεκαετία του 50, ειναι ψευδαίσθηση να πιστεύουμε ότι η Ελλάδα θα μπορέσει μόνη της να πληρώσει τα χρέη. Και όποιος δεν το μπορεί είναι εξ ορισμού χρεοκοπημένος. Τ ώρα θα έπρεπε να καθοριστεί, ποια χρηματικά ποσά είναι έτοιμοι οι πιστωτές να θυσιάσουν. Δηλαδή θα πρέπει να βρούμε ποιός θα πληρώσει το μάρμαρο.

Spiegel Το κράτος που πληρώνει τα περισσότερα είναι η Γερμανία.

Ritschl Μάλλον κάπως έτσι θα πρέπει να γίνει. Αλλά ήμασταν στο παρελθόν πολύ ανέμελοι. Η βιομηχανική μας παραγωγή κέρδισε πολλά από τις υπέρογκες εξαγωγές. Οι αντιελληνικές θέσεις που προβάλλονται από τα ΜΜΕ εδώ είναι πολύ επικίνδυνες. Μην ξεχνάτε ότι ζούμε μέσα σε ένα γυάλινο σπίτι: Τ ο οικονομικό μας θαύμα έγινε δυνατό αποκλειστικά και μόνο επειδή δεν αναγκαστήκαμε να πληρώσουμε αποζημιώσεις.

Spiegel Η Γερμανία δηλαδή θα έπρεπε να είναι πιο συγκρατημένη;

Ritschl Η Γερμανία στον 20ο αιώνα άρχισε δυο πολέμους, τον δεύτερο δε τον διεξήγαγε ως πόλεμο αφανισμού και εξολόθρευσης και στη συνέχεια οι εχθροί της αποποιήθηκαν το δικαίωμα τους εν μέρει η και καθολικά για αποζημιώσεις. Τ ο ότι η Γερμανία πραγματοποίησε το θαύμα της πάνω στις πλάτες άλλων ευρωπαίων δεν το έχουν ξεχάσει οι Έλληνες.

Spiegel Τι εννοείτε;

Ritschl Οι Έλληνες ξέρουν τα εχθρικά άρθρα και γνώμες στα γερμανικά ΜΜΕ πολύ καλά. Αν η διάθεση των Ελλήνων γίνει πολύ πιο επιθετική, μπορεί να αναβιώσουν οι παλιές διεκδικήσεις, αρχίζοντας από την Ελλάδα, και αν η Γερμανία ποτέ αναγκαστεί να πληρώσει, θα μας «πάρουν ακόμη και τα σώβρακα». Θα έπρεπε αντίθετα να είμαστε ευγνώμονες, να εξυγιάνουμε την Ελλάδα με τα λεφτά μας. Αν εμείς εδώ παίξουμε το παιγνίδι των ΜΜΕ, παριστάνοντας τον χοντρό Εμίλ, που καπνίζει το πούρο του και αρνείται να πληρώσει, κάποτε κάποιοι θα μας στείλουν τους παλιούς λογαριασμούς.

Spiegel Τουλάχιστον στο τέλος μερικές ηπιότερες σκέψεις: Αν μπορούσαμε να μάθουμε κάτι από τις εξελίξεις, ποια λύση θα ήταν η καλύτερη για την Ελλάδα και τη Γερμανία;

Ritschl Οι χρεοκοπίες της Γερμανίας τα περασμένα χρόνια το δείχνουν: Τ ο λογικότερο είναι τώρα να συμφωνηθεί μια μείωση του χρέους. Όποιος δάνεισε λεφτά στην Ελλάδα, πρέπει να χάσει ένα μεγάλο μέρος τους. Αυτό θα ήταν καταστροφικό για τις τράπεζες, γι’ αυτό θα ήταν αναγκαίο ένα πρόγραμμα βοήθειας. Μπορεί αυτή η λύση να είναι ακριβή για τη Γερμανία, αλλά έτσι κι αλλιώς θα πρέπει να πληρώσουμε. Κι έτσι θα είχε και η Ελλάδα μια ευκαιρία για μια νέα αρχή.

Albrecht Ritsch , Wirtschaftshistoriker ( καθηγητής “Ιστορίας της Οικονομίας”)

SPIEGEL

Μετάφραση: Πάρις Μπαρμπάτσαλος.

Αντίβαρο

ΠΗΓΗ: http://citypress-gr.blogspot.com/     2011

 

C)Πανούσης: Δεν υπάρχουν καλοί εβραίοι

Εβραίοι – Γουρούνια – Δολοφόνοι κακή σας μέρα, κακό ψόφο να ‘χετε. Η Γάζα να σας τυλίξει σαν σάβανο. Μούμιες να γίνετε ταριχευμένες και να θαφτείτε στα έγκατα των πυραμίδων που φτιάχνετε από τα λεφτά που μαζεύετε. Από αρχαιοτάτων χρόνων, όχι και πολύ να μην το παρακάνουμε, επι Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας οπου εδραιώθηκε το δίκαιο που πατούν οι σεμνοί και ταπεινοί ελβετόψυχοι επιτρέπεται δια νόμου στους εβραίους της εποχής να κάνουν μόνο τρία επαγγέλματα: να είναι σαράφηδες στο δρόμο, να είναι κλόουν και ηθοποιοί στο δρόμο και να μαζεύουν τα σκουπίδια στους δρόμους. Οτι ακριβώς κάνουν και σήμερα… Και εξηγούμαι: ελέγχουν οι εβραίοι όλες τις τράπεζες της αμερικανικής αυτοκρατορίας ελέγχουν όλο το Σόου Μπιζ που είναι σε επιδέξια εβραϊκά χέρια και συνεχίζουν ακάθεκτοι να μαζεύουν όλα του κόσμου τα σκουπίδια έχοντας στην ιδιοκτησία τους τα μουσεία. Τοκογλύφοι, τσιρκολάνοι και σκουπιδιάρηδες μια ζωή, αλλά τα τελευταία χρόνια εξασκούν κι άλλο ένα επικερδές επάγγελμα: Αυτό του επαγγελματία δολοφόνου των παιδιών και γυναικών με μαντίλες. Εχουν κατσικωθεί οι εβραίοι μετά τον πόλεμο στην Παλαιστίνη, σ’ενα μικρό μέρος της στην αρχή αλλά χρόνο με το χρόνο ο Σιωνιστικός μεταστατικός καρκίνος καταβροχθίζει τα πάντα γύρω του και τρέφεται με βομβαρδισμένες σάρκες μικρών παιδιών.

Δε χρειάζεται σε -ονι να τελειώνει, εβραίοι γουρούνια δολοφόνοι.

Καταδικάζουμε την βία από όπου και αν προέρχεται, ε; αυτοί οι συνασπισμένοι πασοκομασωνοι της αριστεράς και της γωνίας μας έχουν αλαλιάσει. Ιδια είναι η βια του πιτσιρικά με την σφενδόνα και του πρεζοναύτη με το μπαζούκας, ίδια είναι η βία των τραπεζών που ξεκληρίζουν οικογένειες που αρπάζουν τα σπίτια με την βία του παιδιού με την μολότωφ που καίει ένα υποκατάστημα ασφαλισμένο ίδια έιναι η βία με τα 26 αυτοσχέδια πυραυλάκια της χαμάς με το πυρηνικό οπλοστάσιο του ισραήλ το Ισραήλ που κάνει λαγό τον Ομπάμα χριστουγεννιάτικα μέχρι να βγάλει ο μαυρούλης την στολή του γκολγ να φορέσει την πανοπλία και να βάλει φωτιά στα περσικά τα χαλιά τα ιπτάμενα  σε λιγο δεν θα φαίνεται χαζή η ερώτηση της ξανθιάς: ιραν η ιράκ. θα ισοπεδωθούν και τα δυο με τεράστιες τρύπες για να παίζουν γκολφ οι ναζί σιωνιστές

Δε χρειάζεται σε -ονι να τελειώνει, εβραίοι γουρούνια δολοφόνοι.

Εβραίοι – Γουρούνια – Δολοφόνοι. Εγώ θα το λέω κι ας ενοχλούνται οι Δωσίλογοι της Αριστεράς και οι κωλόγριες του Πολιτικού Ορθολογισμού ότι υπάρχουν και καλοί Εβραίοι, υπάρχουν και καλοί αστυνομικοί κι ότι δεν είναι σωστό να τους βάλουμε στο ίδιο τσουβάλι όλους. Καλή μου κυρία,όταν έχω τον μπάτσο απέναντι και με ψεκάζει με ληγμένο εβραϊκό χυμό – Jewish juice που λέμε – θα ρωτίξω τι ζώδιο είναι και να μου δείξει την φτωχή φορολογική του δήλωση, πριν του εκσφενδονίσω την αμυντική μου μπουκάλα;

Τελειώνουν και οι παλαιστίνιοι σιγά σιγά στην γάζα αλλά ότι και να κάνουνε οι αμερικανοεβραίοι μιλιταριστές είναι καταδικασμένοι γιατί οι εβραϊκές οικογένειες κάνουν 1 με δυο παιδιά ενώ οι μουσουλμάνοι οκτώ με δώδεκα.
Ναζίσιωνιστές θα πεθάνουν αγάμητοι «γελια» φιδάκια

Τζίμυ Πανούσης – Δούρειος Ηχος της 5/1/2009

Αυτό είναι το κείμενο της εκπομπής του Τζίμη Πανούση, που μεταδίδεται καθημερινά από τον ραδιοφωνικό σταθμό City 99,5 ιδιοκτησίας Θεόδωρου και Γιάννας Αγγελόπουλου, (όχι κάποιο περιθωριακό σταθμό) και το οποίο μπορείτε να ακούσετε οι ίδιοι εδώ. Σημειωτέον η ανάρτηση αυτή αφορά μόνο την 5 Ιανουαρίου γιατί πιθανόν να συνέχισε και άλλες μέρες όπως υποθέτω από τα σχόλια εδώ.

Σπάνια έχω την ευκαιρία να έχω μπροστά μου έναν άνθρωπο που θεωρείται προοδευτικός και εναντίον του ρατσισμού, κατά δική του ομολογία, να μιλάει με τόσους ξεκάθαρους όρους για το τι πιστεύει για τους εβραίους. Μπορεί οι όροι που χρησιμοποίησε να ήταν λίγο μη καθωσπρέπει αλλά, διάολε , αυτό είναι που εκτιμούμε όλοι στον Τζίμη Πανούση. Ο Τζίμης Πανούσης αυτή την φορά εξέφρασε το συναίσθημα πολλών ελλήνων, αριστερών και δεξιών – ορθόδοξων και άθεων, για το τι είμαι εγώ και οι εβραίοι γενικότερα: διαχρονικά τοκογλύφοι, με πάθος για τα πολιτισμικά σκουπίδια, ελέγχουμε την σοου μπίζ, ζάπλουτοι με πυραμίδες χρημάτων ελέγχοντας τις τράπεζες και οτι στην πραγματικότητα όλοι οι εβραίοι είμαστε το ίδιο σατανικοί και δολοφόνοι, μετενσάρκωση των ναζί. Στο τέλος κάνει μια ευχή ώστε να εκλείψει, με ειρηνικό τρόπο οφείλω να ομολογήσω, η φάρα των ιουδαίων φονιάδων. Και όλα αυτά δεν χρειάστηκε ο σιωνισμός αλλά αποτελούν διαχρονικό χαρακτήρα του εβραϊκού λαού από αρχαιοτάτων χρόνων.

Άλλωστε μην ξεχνάμε οτι το σύνθημα της εκπομπής «Εβραίοι Γουρούνια Δολοφόνοι» δεν είναι εφεύρεση του Τζίμη Πανούση αλλά έχει προλάβει να κατοχυρωθεί από την ακροδεξιά Χρυσή Αυγή και το ακροαριστερό ΝΑΡ. Είναι σπάνια η εθνική ομοψυχία που μας επιτρέπει να βρίσκουμε το ίδιο σύνθημα τόσο στην Δεξιά, όσο και στην Αριστερά. Ο Τζίμης Πανούσης μας ενώνει όλους !

ΥΓ. Εγραψαν: Κώστας Κατσουλάρης, περιούσιος, Νίκος Δήμου, η εφημερίδα Στόχος και ο JustAnotherOneGoneOff σε άσχετο χρόνο. Bonus track:Συνέντευξη της κόρης του Μίκη Θεοδωράκη το 2006 στην οποία οι εβραίοι έλληνες είναι «πλουτοκράτες» (!) και ο Πανούσης αξιοθαύμαστος – αν μη τι άλλο υπάρχει ιδεολογική ομοιογένεια στο χώρο. Το παρόν κείμενο είχε γραφεί στο παρελθόν και δεν είχα σκοπό να το δημοσιεύσω αλλά το κλείσιμο του Ελεύθερου Τύπου μου επιτρέπει να το κάνω χωρίς κραυγές περί οτι με το μακρύ  σιωνιστικό χέρι μου βλάπτω την ελευθερία του λόγου στην Ελλάδα.

PEEGEE https://abravanel.wordpress.com 2009

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EUROPEANS AND MEDITERRANEANS LETS RETHINK OUR ANCIENT PAST

The Athenian Origins of Direct Democracy

One of the hallmarks of GREEK CIVILIZATION was the polis, or city-state. The city-states were small, independent communities which were male-dominated and bound together by race. What this means is that membership in the polis was hereditary and could not be passed on to someone outside the citizen family. The citizens of any given polis were an elite group of people – slaves, peasants, women and resident aliens were not part of the body of citizens.

Originally the polis referred to a defensible area to which farmers of a particular area could retreat in the event of an attack. The Acropolis in Athens is one such example. Over time, towns grew around these defensible areas. The growth of these towns was unplanned and unlike the city-states we encounter at Sumer, they were not placed for commercial convenience near rivers or seas. In fact, the poleis were situated well inland to avoid raids by sea. With time, the agora or marketplace began to appear within the polis. The agora was not only a marketplace but the heart of Greek intellectual life and discourse.

The scale of the polis was indeed small. When the philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) came to discuss the origins of the polis in his book POLITICS in the early 4thcentury B.C. he suggested that “it is necessary for the citizens to be of such a number that they knew each other’s personal qualities and thus can elect their officials and judge their fellows in a court of law sensibly.” Before Aristotle, Plato fixed the number of citizens in an ideal state at 5040 adult males. For Plato (c.427-c.347 B.C.), as it was for Aristotle, the one true criteria of the size of the polis was that all the citizens know one another. The issue at stake here is between public and private worlds. The ancient Greeks did not really see two distinct worlds in the lives of the citizenry. Instead, the public world was to be joined with the private world.

The citizens in any given polis were related to one another by blood and so family ties were very strong. As boys, they grew up together in schools, and as men, they served side by side during times of war. They debated one another in public assemblies – they elected one another as magistrates – they cast their votes as jurors for or against their fellow citizens. In such a society – the society of the polis – all citizens were intimately and directly involved in politics, justice, military service, religious ceremonies, intellectual discussion, athletics and artistic pursuits. To shirk one’s responsibilities was not only rare but reprehensible in the eyes of the Greek citizen. Greek citizens did not have rights, but duties. A citizen who did not fulfill his duties was socially disruptive. At the polis of Sparta, such a citizen was called “an Inferior.” At Athens, a citizen who held no official position or who was not a habitual orator in the Assembly was branded as idiotai.

Every polis was different from another. For example, some poleis had different names for the months of the year. Although there were similarities and differences between the city-states, they all made the effort to preserve their own unique identity. What we call the ancient Greek world was really hundreds of independent city-states or poleis. No one polis was a replica of another. Those who lived within the confines of a city state considered everyone else to be inferior. Furthermore, those people who did not speak Greek were referred to as barbar, the root of our word barbarian.

Sparta
There were two city-states that were indicative of Greek city-states as a whole: Sparta and Athens. At Sparta, located on the Peloponnesus, five Dorian villages combined to form the Spartan state. In the 8th century, this state conquered all the other peoples of Laconia, one of the most fertile plains in Greece. Although the Spartans extended their territory, they did not extend their citizenship. The new subjects (perioikoi) were residents of Lacedaemonia, but citizens remained limited to those native born at Sparta.

From Lycurgus (no one knows who this man was or why his name carried so much significance for the Spartans), we learn that boys left home at the age of seven. They were organized into troops and played competitive games until their 18th year, when they underwent four years of military training. From the ages of 18 to 28 they lived together in barracks. At the age of 30, they became citizens in their own right. Amongst themselves they were called “Equals” – in the eyes of everyone else, they were Spartans. There was state education for girls who lived at home but who were also organized into troops. Boys and girls met together to learn basic studies as well as to dance, sing and play musical instruments. Relations between the sexes was much more free than anywhere else in the Greek world. However, after marriage (usually at 30 for men, 16 for women), the husband ate at the men’s club until the age of 60 while his wife remained at home.

The Spartan state arranged for a basic equality in land holding and provided the citizens with laborers, called helots (conquered people such as the Messenians who became Spartan serfs). In other words, the economy was based on the idea that slaves would labor to supply the Spartan armies with food, drink and clothing. As a result, the slave population of Sparta was enormous, thus necessitating the sort of militaristic state that Sparta indeed became. The Spartan constitution allowed for two kings and was therefore a dual monarchy. As the highest magistrates in the city-state, these kings decided issues of war and peace.

The Spartan constitution was mixed, containing elements of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy. The oligarchic element was represented by a Council (gerousia) of elders consisting of twenty-eight men over the age of sixty who were held office for life. The elders had important judicial functions and were also consulted before any proposal was put before the Assembly of Spartan citizens. The Assembly (apella) consisted of all male citizens over thirty years of age. In theory, it was the Assembly who was the final authority but in practice the real function of the Assembly was to ratify decisions already decided upon by the elders and kings

For the Greeks, citizenship – that is, the active participation of all citizens in politics – was considered to be the supreme creative art. In essence, the city-state was synonymous with its citizenry. Like a sculptor, the citizen molded a fully rounded society to his preconceived notion of what that society ought to be.

The system developed by the Spartan state by the late 6th century B.C. was deliberate and purposeful. It was created not just to keep the ever-growing population of helots in check but rather to realize man’s full ideal within the society of the polis. The Spartan ideal was austere, severe and limited according to our standards. But when political thinkers such as Plato decided to create their own ideal society on paper, they turned to Sparta for examples and not to Athens. I imagine the real reason for this is that the Spartans created a world in both theory and practice, while the Athenians almost always seemed lost in what might come to be. Although we may find the Spartan world to be repressive or indeed oppressive, this is not the way the Spartans saw it. After all, they had equality in education, training and opportunity. They also enjoyed a large income as well as pride and glory.

Athens
While Sparta developed their control over the Peloponnesus, the city-state of Athens controlled the area of the Attic Peninsula, to the east and northeast of Sparta. Athens was similar to other city-states of the period of the Greek Renaissance with two important differences: (1) it was larger both geographically and in terms of its population and (2) those people it conquered were not reduced to servitude – this was the rule at Sparta. So, Athens never faced the problem of trying to control a large population of angry and sometimes violent subjects. This also explains why Sparta had to remain an intensely militaristic state.

Around the year 600 B.C., and while Lycurgus was reforming the legal system of the Spartan state, Athens faced a deepening political crisis. Those farmers who supplied the city-state with food could not keep up with demand because the Athenian population had grown too quickly. Farmers began to trade their land to obtain food and quickly went bankrupt as they traded away their last piece of land. The crisis was solved in 594 B.C. when the Athenians gave control over to Solon (c.640-c.559 B.C.), a former high official. In his role as archon, Solon cancelled all agricultural debts and announced that all slaves were free. He also passed constitutional reforms that divided Athenian subjects into four classes based on their annual agricultural production rather than birth. Members of the three highest orders could hold public office.

Solon’s system excluded all those people who did not own any productive land – women, children, slaves, resident aliens, artisans and merchants. However, with the constitutional reforms of Solon, men from newer and less-established families could work their way up economically and achieve positions of political leadership. Solon did not end the agricultural crisis in Greece and so factional strife remained.

In 561, the former military leader Pisistratus (c.600-527 B.C.) appeared at Athens and seized the Acropolis and began to rule as a tyrant in place of Solon. Down to 527, the year of his death, he rewarded dispossessed peasants with land confiscated from wealthier families. He also encouraged trade and industry and engaged in great public works programs. Temples were built and religious centers improved. New religious festivals were also introduced by Pisistratus, such as the one devoted to the god Dionysis, the god of fertility.

By the middle of the 6th century, the city had grown in size and in wealth. Furthermore, the common people had become more sure of themselves — they had a high standard of living, more leisure time at their disposal and were far-better informed than their ancestors had been. Since a tyrant like Pisistratus wanted to give his power over to a more popular base of support, it was during his reign that the average citizen obtained his political experience. Furthermore, because men continued to qualify for office on the basis of wealth, and since incomes were rising in the 6th century, there was a greater number of citizens being included in the operation of the government.

Pisistratus was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, whose rule was somewhat similar to that of his father. In 514 B.C., his brother Hipparchus was murdered and Hippias became nervous and suspicious.  Finally, one of the noble clans exiled by the sons of Pisistratus, the Alemaeonids, won favor with the oracle at Delphi and used its support to persuade Sparta to attack the Athenian tyranny. Led by Cleomenes I, the Spartans marched into Athenian territory in 510 B.C. Hippias was deposed and fled to Persia. 

Cleomenes’ friend Isagoras held the leading position in Athens after the withdrawal of the Spartan troops, but he was not unopposed. Cleisthenes, of the restored Alemaeonid clan was his chief rival. Isagoras tried to restore a version of the pre-Solonian aristocratic state by purifying the citizen lists

Cleisthenes took an unprecedented action by turning to the people for political support and won with it a program of great popular appeal. In 508 B.C., Cleisthenes instituted a new political organization whereby the citizens would take a more forceful and more direct role in running the city-state. He called this new political organization demokratia, or democracy – rule by the entire body of citizens. He created a Council of Five Hundred which planned the business of the public assemblies. All male citizens over the age of thirty could serve for a term of one year on the Council and no one could serve more than two terms in a lifetime. Such an organization was necessary, thought Cleisthenes, so that every citizen would learn from direct political experience. With such a personal interest in his democracy, Cleisthenes believed that there would be no citizens to conspire and attempt to abolish the system.

Cleisthenes also divided all Athenians into ten tribes (replacing the original four). The composition of each tribe guaranteed that no region would dominate any of them. Because the tribes had common religious activities and fought as regimental units, the new organization would also increase devotion to the polis and diminish regional division.

Each tribe would send fifty men to serve on the Council of Five Hundred (thus replacing Solon’s Council of 400). Each set of fifty men would serve as a presiding committee for a period of thirty-five days. The Council convened the Assembly – an Assembly which, as of the year 450 B.C. – consisted of approximately 21,000 citizens. Of this number, perhaps 12-15000 were absent as they were serving in the army, navy or were simply away from Athens on business or otherwise. The Council scrutinized the qualifications of officials and the allocation of funds. They looked after the construction of docks and surveyed public buildings. They collected rent on public land and oversaw the redistribution of confiscated property. Members of the Council were also responsible for examining the horses of the cavalry, administering state pensions and receiving foreign delegations. In other words, the Council was responsible for the smooth running of the daily operations of the Athenian city-state.

Membership on the Council was for one year but it was possible to serve a second term. A minimum of 250 new members had to be chosen every year and it has been suggested that 35-45% of all Athenian citizens had experience on the Council. Serving on the Council of Five Hundred was a full time job and those who did serve were paid a fee.

Every year 500 Council members and 550 Guards were chosen by lot from the villages of the Athenian polis. These men were scrutinized by the Council before they were chosen so that alternates were always available. The rapid turnover in the Council ensured (1) that a large number of Athenians held some political position in their lifetime and that (2) the Assembly would contain a larger and more sophisticated membership. The Assembly contained all those citizens who were not serving on the Council of 500 or who were not serving as public officials. The Assembly had forty regular meetings per year – there were four meetings in each 35 day period into which the Council’s year was divided. The first meeting discussed the corn supply, the qualifications of officials, questions of defense and ostracisms. The second meeting was open to any issue, while the third and fourth meetings were given over to debates on religion and foreign and secular affairs. Special meetings or emergency sessions could be called at any time.

Around 460 B.C., Pericles (c.490-429 B.C.) used the power of the people in the law courts and the Assembly to break up the Council of Five Hundred. Under Pericles, ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY came to mean the equality of justice and the equality of opportunity. The equality of justice was secured by the jury system, which ensured that slaves and resident aliens were represented through their patrons. The equality of opportunity did not mean that every man has the right to everything. What it did mean is that the criteria for choosing citizens for office was merit and efficiency and not wealth. Whereas Solon had used the criterion of birth for his officials and Cleisthenes had used wealth, Pericles now used merit. This was the ideal for Pericles. What indeed happened in practice was quite different. The Greek historian Thucydides (c.460-c.400 B.C.) commented on the reality of democracy under Pericles when he wrote: “It was in theory, a democracy but in fact it became the rule of the first Athenian.” And the historian Herodotus (c.485-425 B.C.) added that “nothing could be found better than the one man, the best.” This “one man, the best,” was the aristoi, the word from which we get the expression aristocracy. So, what began as Greek democracy under Cleisthenes around 500 B.C., became an aristocracy under Pericles by 430 B.C.

The Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly met often and what they discussed focused on decidedly local issues. But they also discussed what we could only call democratic theory – that is, they constantly debated questions like what is the good life? and what is the best form of government? But perhaps the most important of all were discussions and debates over the issues of war. And this is important to grasp for the 5th century, the classical age of Greece, is an age of near constant warfare. Between 490 and 474 B.C., the Greeks fought the Persians and at the end of the century (431-404 B.C.), a war between Sparta and Athens not only spelled the end of Athenian dominance, but also the death of Athenian direct democracy.

SOURCE  LECTURES ON ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL EUROPEAN HISTORY

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ΟΙ ΣΠΟΡΟΙ ΤΟΥ ΗΛΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΚΥΜΑΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΟΙΚΟΥ

Οι δικές μας προτάσεις για διέξοδο από την οικονομική- κοινωνική- οικολογική κρίση
Βιώνουμε τον πρόλογο μιας παρατεταμένης ύφεσης και μιαςοικονομικής, κοινωνικής και περιβαλλοντικής κρίσης άνευ προηγουμένου για τα μεταπολιτευτικά δεδομένα.
Μια κρίση που δεν την προκάλεσαν οι νέοι, οι μαθητές, οι φοιτητές, οι εργαζόμενοι, οι άνεργοι και οι συνταξιούχοι που υφίστανται τα μέτρα λιτότητας, αλλά οι διεθνείς -σε συνεργασία με τις εγχώριες- τραπεζο-οικονομικές ελίτ που εξακολουθούν και θησαυρίζουν από τη δυστυχία των πολλών.
Θεωρούμε αποκλειστικά υπεύθυνους για αυτή τη κρίση τιςιδιωτικές τράπεζες, τα πολυεθνικά χρηματοπιστωτικά ιδρύματα, την οικονομία της “ελεύθερης αγοράς” και τις χρεοκοπημένες πολιτικές ενός διεφθαρμένου πολιτικού συστήματος τα τελευταία 50 χρόνια στην Ελλάδα. Ένα διεφθαρμένο πολιτικό σύστημα και μια κοινωνία του βολέματος που επένδυσαν προσεχτικά όλα αυτά τα χρόνια σε μιαβρώμικη, όσο ο λιθάνθρακας, οικονομία της αφθονίας, του δανεισμού, της κατανάλωσης και της εκμετάλλευσης, συναλλασσόμενοι μέσα σε ένα σάπιο πελατειακό- πολιτικό σύστημα.
Σε αυτή την οικονομία του χρήματος και τη δικτατορία των αγορών θέλουμε να αντιτάξουμε την οικονομία των φυσικών πόρων, της εξοικονόμησης, της απο-ανάπτυξης και της τοπικοποίησης, την αλληλέγγυα οικονομία της προσφοράς και της αλληλοβοήθειας, τον οικολογικό μετασχηματισμό της κοινωνίας προς όφελος των πολλών, την διεθνοποίηση και την πολυπολιτισμικότητα

Στις επόμενες παραγράφους σας προτείνουμε μια σειρά ριζοσπαστικών μεταρρυθμίσεων, βραχυπρόθεσμων και μεσοπρόθεσμων, για να καλυφθεί αφενός ένα μέρος του ελλείμματος και του χρέους, και αφετέρου για να μην υπονομευθούν περαιτέρω τα κοινωνικά- εργασιακά κεκτημένα από επιπλέον μέτρα λιτότητας, καθώς και να εξοικονομηθούν πολύτιμοι πόροι προς όφελος της κοινωνικής πρόνοιας και δημόσιων αγαθών(υγεία, παιδεία, έρευνα, πολιτισμός, περιβάλλον).
Οι παρακάτω προτάσεις μπορεί να θεωρούνται ριζοσπαστικές για την ελληνική πραγματικότητα, είναι όμωςρεαλιστικές, επιτυχώς εφαρμοσμένες διεθνώς, και θεωρούμε ότι έχουν την υποστήριξη μιας υπολογίσιμης κρίσιμης μάζας της ελληνικής κοινωνίας.
Με δεδομένο ότι η τωρινή κρίση δανεισμού σε Ελλάδα, Ιρλανδία, Πορτογαλία και αλλού δεν είναι παρά μια δομική διορθωτική κίνηση των ελεύθερων αγορών του καπιταλιστικού- νεοφιλελεύθερου οικονομικού μοντέλου με στόχο τη κερδοσκοπία και την περαιτέρω συσσώρευση του πλούτου, προτείνουμε:
1. Την επαναδιαπραγμάτευση- αναδιάρθρωση του χρέους της Ελλάδας (κατά 60-70%), κατά τα πρότυπα της Αργεντινής και του Εκουαδόρ, χωρίς όμως αποχώρηση από την ΕΕ. Προτείνουμε την άμεση παύση πληρωμής τοκοχρεολυσίων (ιδιαίτερα των υπέρογκων τόκων), καθώς αυτά προήλθαν από κερδοσκοπικές πρακτικές ιδιωτικών τραπεζών και διεθνών επενδυτικών οίκων. Είναι απαραίτητη η σύσταση Διεθνούς Επιτροπής Λογιστικού Ελέγχουγια να επιβεβαιωθεί το ποσοστό του χρέους που είναι απεχθές και παράνομο.
2. Την φορολόγηση της κερδοφορίας των ιδιωτικών τραπεζών με τον ανώτατο δυνατό συντελεστή και των χρηματοπιστωτικών- χρηματιστηριακών συναλλαγών κατά τουλάχιστον 1.5%.
3. Θέσπιση ειδικής εισφοράς (φόρου) πλουσίων, όπου θα φορολογηθούν κατά 10% οι χρηματοπιστωτικές και χρηματιστηριακές συναλλαγές και ο πλούτος του πλουσιότερου 2% της χώρας.
4. Κατάργηση των τοξικών χρηματιστηριακών και πιστωτικών προϊόντων που μετατρέπουν το χρέος σε κέρδος (βλ. CDS, κλπ) και κοινωνικός έλεγχος των ιδιωτικών τραπεζών.
5. Το πάγωμα των εξοπλιστικών δαπανών για 10 χρόνια και την σταδιακή μείωση των εξοπλιστικών προγραμμάτων κατά ¾ μετά το 2020.
6. Την άμεση κατάργηση της υποχρεωτικής στρατιωτικής θητείας και των στρατιωτικών- μαθητικών παρελάσεων. Επένδυση στο στρατηγικό ρόλο που κατέχει η Ελλάδα ως νοτιο-ανατολικό σύνορο της Ευρώπης αλλά και ως ένα ιστορικά πολυπολιτισμικό σταυροδρόμι.
7. Την αποποινικοποίηση της χρήσης ουσιών και την ελεγχόμενη κλινική διάθεση ουσιών σε τοξικοεξαρτημένα άτομα με συνταγογράφηση (εξοικονόμηση εκατοντάδων εκατομμυρίων ευρώ από την καταστολή, έσοδα από φορολογία, επανατροφοδότηση κονδυλίων στην πρόληψη, καταπολέμηση του παράνομου εμπορίου).
8. Τη νομιμοποίηση της (αυτο)καλλιέργειας της ινδικής κάνναβης (για θεραπευτικούς- διατροφικούς σκοπούς) και της κλωστικής κάνναβης (για βιομηχανικούς σκοπούς). Ρύθμιση του παράνομου εμπορίου κατά τα πρότυπα του καπνού και του αλκοόλ (εξοικονόμηση εκατοντάδων εκατομμυρίων ευρώ από την καταστολή, πολλαπλάσια έσοδα από τη φορολόγηση).
9. Τη καταγραφή και φορολόγηση της εκκλησιαστικής- μοναστηριακής περιουσίας με τον ανώτερο δυνατό συντελεστή και το πλήρη διαχωρισμό κράτους- εκκλησίας.
10. Την αναδιοργάνωση της αγροτικής οικονομίας με έμφαση στην βιολογική ποιοτική καλλιέργεια και τηδιατήρηση παραδοσιακών ποικιλιών.
11. Την χορήγηση ασύλου σε μετανάστες που επιθυμούν να μείνουν και να εργαστούν στην Ελλάδα ή να προωθηθούν σε άλλες χώρες της ΕΕ (σε ποσοστά που να ξεπερνούν τον Ευρωπαϊκό μέσο όρο χορήγησης ασύλου > 25-30%).
12. Την επανάκτηση (και δημιουργία νομικού πλαισίου για την αξιοποίηση) εγκαταλελειμμένων αγροτικών γαιών από νέους αγρότες οργανωμένους σε συνεταιρισμούς λαϊκής βάσης. Παροχή φορολογικών και οικονομικών κινήτρων.
13. Τη δημιουργία και υποστήριξη οικοκοινοτήτων, δικτύων αλληλοϋποστήριξης, πιλοτικών εμπειριών αυτοοργάνωσης και αλληλοβοηθητικών- κοινωνικών επιχειρήσεων με έμφαση στην προστασία του φυσικού περιβάλλοντος, την οικολογική γεωργία- κτηνοτροφία, την ενεργειακή αυτονομία και τον οικο-άγρο-τουρισμό.
14. Την οργάνωση της τοπικής- οικιακής παραγωγής ενέργειας από ΑΠΕ, τη δημιουργία κοινοτικών συνεταιριστικών ενώσεων ΑΠΕ λαϊκής βάσης, την τοποθέτηση ενός εκατομμυρίου ηλιακές στέγες, καθώς και την αξιοποίηση του αιολικού δυναμικού με στόχο 25% ενέργεια από ανανεώσιμες πηγές μέχρι το 2025 και ενεργειακή αυτονομία από ΑΠΕ για καθε νοικοκυριό μέχρι το 2050.
15. Τη δημιουργία και υποστήριξη συνεταιριστικών ενώσεων παραγωγών, δικτύων παραγωγών- καταναλωτών, εναλλακτικών μορφών οικονομικής δικτύωσης και τοπικών ανταλλακτικών συστημάτων χωρίς χρήματα (πχ τράπεζες χρόνου).
16. Τη δημιουργία και ενίσχυση ταμείων αλληλοβοήθειας και τοπικών μικροπιστωτικών μη-κερδοσκοπικών ιδρυμάτων (κοινωνικές τράπεζες με ισόποσους μετόχους τους καταθέτες).
17. Την αντικατάσταση του μαθήματος των θρησκευτικών από αντίστοιχο διαπολιτισμικής εκπαίδευσης για τη μη-βία και τη πολυπολιτισμική συνύπαρξη.
18. Τη νομιμοποίηση της ελεύθερης κατασκήνωσης παράλληλα με την αυτορύθμιση των κοινοτήτων ελευθεροκατασκηνωτών μέσα από τη προώθηση ενός κώδικα ελεύθερης και υπεύθυνης κατασκήνωσης, τη δημιουργίαβασικών υποδομών (τουαλέτες, ντουζιέρες, πόσιμο νερό, κάδοι απορριμμάτων) σε περιοχές ελεύθερης κατασκήνωσης, καθώς και την ανακαίνιση των οργανωμένων κάμπινγκ σύμφωνα με τα οικολογικά κριτήρια για την απονομή κοινοτικού οικολογικού σήματος σε υπηρεσίες κατασκηνώσεων/ κάμπινγκ (Απόφαση της Επιτροπής 2009/564/ΕΚ) και να τη μετατροπή τους σε καλαίσθητους και πρότυπους χώρους υποδοχής, φιλοξενίας και δραστηριοποίησης οικο-ταξιδευτών.
19. Θέσπιση αυστηρών κριτηρίων διαφάνειας και λογοδοσίας για την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς στη δημόσια διοίκηση, τη σπατάλη του δημοσίου χρήματος και τη χρηματοδότηση των κομμάτων. Ανάπτυξη δικτύων ελεύθερου λογισμικού και ανοιχτού κώδικα για τη μηχανοργάνωση όλων των δημόσιων υπηρεσιών, προστασία τωνψηφιακών ελευθεριών και ενίσχυση του ψηφιακού αλφαβητισμού της κοινωνίας.
20. Θεσμοθέτηση της απλής αναλογικής, των θεματικών δημοψηφισμάτων σε τοπικό και εθνικό επίπεδο, καθώς και ενίσχυση των τοπικών δομών άμεσης δημοκρατίας, ιδιαίτερα των συμμετοχικών προϋπολογισμών- αναπτυξιακών σχεδιασμών σε επίπεδο Δήμου και Περιφέρειας. Θεσμοθέτηση συμβουλίων, ανοιχτών συνελεύσεων, σε επίπεδο γειτονιάς, δήμου και περιφέρειας. 

Για εμάς είναι η ώρα της αξιοπρέπειας, η ώρα του αγώνα, η ώρα να μεταμορφωθεί το εγώ σε εμείς

Ηλιόσποροι

ΠΗΓΗ http://www.iliosporoi.net

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    UTOPIAN SOCIETIES (VIb) – UTOPIAS IN ROO(M)CIA – ROU(M)SIA – RUSSIA

    (BEING CONTINUED FROM  10/05/14 )

    UTOPIAS OF SPACE
    Utopias of space are programs for a new environment, new institutions, and new  habits to fit the coming arrangement of things. They differ from temporal utopia  in that they are seen to be feasible in the very near future — and their prophets  are always ready to begin at once. They are utopian none the less in that they go  against the current reality in a far more drastic way than the political, economic,and social programs that corn flowing out of any révolution. It might well be argued that all of Bolshevism was such a utopia. But the Bolshevik Révolution  proclaimed and put into action very much that was concrete and limited in scope.
    A utopia must hâve an overall vision of what society should be like. I shall limit my discussion to those that seem most représentative and most comprehensive in  the sweep of their aspirations : Prussianism, Mechanization, Militarization, and Urbanization.

    The 1916 appeal, Against Civilization, subsequently revised and Bolshevized in 1918, for the Prussianization of Russian society by the two intellectuals, Evgenii  Poletaev and Nikolai Punin, seems at first glance an isolated literary épisode  without much resonance1 . But in fact it resonated with ideas that were much in  the air during World War I and the Russian Civil War : the hopelessly flaccid and  degenerate condition of Western civilization and the beauty and utility of harshness.
    Against civilization rhapsodized at lenght, in Nietzschean and Spenglerian tones,
    about the décomposition of English and French civilization with their individual  egoism and their cults of the romantic and the sentimental. To this they opposed  Germanie Kultur : discipline, bravery, hardness, military prowess, solidarity, battlefield  camaraderie, and organization. After the révolution they joined these notions  to what they saw as similar ones in Bolshevism : the organizational power of the  machine, proletarian solidarity, class violence, hierarchy, and obédience — first  for war and then for industrial survival. The first two Bolshevik Commissars of  War, Trotsky and Frunze, might not háve read Against Civilization, but they  certainly showed themselves at times in full sympathy with some of its ideas for  a militarized society.
    The vision of Alexei Gastev to mechanize the Russian proletarian and raw  peasant recruits to the factory was both more concrète and more extravagant.
    Gastev was an intellectual who had made himself a worker before the révolution,
    then an industrial poet, and then a utopian prophet of human mechanization.
    His utopian prose poem, Express (1916), traced the journey of a train through a  future superindustrialized Siberia. After the révolution he called for a new society in the near future in which the world would be transformed into an urbanized  machine, its inhabitants mechanized and standardized down to appearance, nomenclature, émotions, language, and even thought2 . It was undoubtedly these works that moved Zamyatin to write We. In the 1920s, Gastev founded and ran the Central Institute of Labor on Taylorist principles (though called Scientific Organization of  Labor in Soviet parlance). Its aim was to transform a disorganized and  undisciplined work force, with its rustic notions of time, space, order, and motion,into smoothly functioning components of industrial civilization. Like Frederick  Winslow Taylor, who inspired him, Gastev clocked the workers’ movements, measured out normš for industrial tasks, and drilled his pupils in orderliness and  punctuality. But he went far beyond Taylorism (once dubbed « a normal American madness ») and preached compulsively the virtues of awareness, submission  to the rhythm of the machine, and a geometrie and mechanical style of life and  work.
    Punin, Poletaev, and Gastev sought to change the environment through  organization,ichnology, and mechanization of the individual psychology — to make
    the leap into modernity and prosperity by varying degrees of outward transformation of the « system » or environment and inward reform of the psyche. A rather  différent, more primitive, design for remaking Soviet society — but almost solely as a mode of defence of the State — was the now much-talked-about « militarization of society » enunciated by War Commissar Mikhail Frunze in the mid 1920s.
    Struck by the prospect of a future war of immense destructive power, by the  enormous cost of conducting the next conflict, by the staggering backwardness of Russia’s infrastructure, and by the looming menace of death from the skies by means of long distance bombing, Frunze concluded that the old différence between  front and rear in time of war would disappear and that the entire nation would be living on a military front. The only way to prépare for this, he argued, was the complète militarization of society (voennizacija obščestva), by which he meant  militarization of discipline, ranks, and organization in the government, a wartime  footing for the economy, and a permanent military posture for the entire population— thus turning the Soviet Union into an armed camp in the most literal sense   of the term. It was in some ways reminiscent of the schemes of Tsar Alexander I. and his War Minister Arakcheev to plant military colonies ail over the Empire and  militarize the life of the peasants. Frunze’s plan was never realized in peacetime,though there are a number of contemporary Western analysts of Soviet affairs who  believe that Soviet society is now moving exactly in that direction3 .
    Surely the most important, interesting, and relevant of the utopias of space – and the one most written about in the West4 — is the phenomenon of town planning in the  late 1920s and early 1930s. Opinions on the future of the city constitute  a very rich and multiformed spectrum, running from anti-urbanist desires to  blow up the towns and rusticate Russia, through various intersecting and overlapping  schools or « urbanizing » and « de-urbanizing » , to suggestions by lyrical  enthusiasts to eliminate nature altogether in favor of a single global city. Soviet  town planners and architects fell in the middle catégories and argued over issues  such as how large, how far apart, how dense, how high, and in what form the new  cities or non-cities should be laid out. Their plans were for the most part socially,economically, and geographically very radical, and thus utopian, but as utopias
    of space — environment for the immédiate future — they were solemnly conceived
    and seriously discussed.
    In what kind of homes and in what kind of cities should socialist people live ?
    Home and town planners of the revolutionary period were not much indebted to  the traditions of Fourier and Chernyshevsky whose communal structures, though  adorned with technology, were meant to be located in rural milieux. Their direct  inspiration were the European Garden City movement and German Social Démocrat  iuerban utopianism, both from the tum of the century. The former was geographically radical but socially conservative. The latter was the reverse. Writers such  as Kautsky, Atlanticus, Braun, Zetkin, and Bebel, impressed by rapid urbanization  and the possibilities of gaz, electricity, and rapid transit, saw the communal apartment building as the residential model of the future socialist city. The combination  of communal cooking and feeding, technology applied to tenant services, and  individual rooms combinable for families, would allow for the  économie émancipationof women from housework, a space and time for communal and convivial  encounters among the résidents, and space for privacy as well. This belief was
    developed among the Bolsheviks before the révolution by those interested in the
    position of women and in the future of the family : Kolontai, Krupskaya, Armand,
    and Lenin5 . Soviet ideological architects of the 1920s saw the communal apartment
    house (or House Commune) as a social incubator of the new society, endowing  the residential environment with an almost physically transformative power.
    In the mid-1920s, the urban communal vision began to possess city planners.
    Some of them advanced outlandish, fantastic, and often delightful dreams of a  new communal world. The architect Leonidov, for example, envisioned Russians  living in small House Communes of sixteen families each, united in their daily  life by an enclosed winter garden, and set in a huge network of linear cities covering  the vastness of Russia. A school of town planning known as the Urbanists projected massive communites of 40-50,000 people in House Communes clustered around a  factory, with individual cells for every person, including married couples. Newlyweds  could move into adjoining rooms and those who divorced could simply  close the Connecting door. A variant Urbanist schéme, reminiscent of Zamyatin’s  nightmare, provided for segregated, barracks-like dormitories with rigid schedules  of the day’s routine and spécial days for sexual cohabitation. On the other hand,a realistic Urbanist allowed for temporary kitchens in each living space which could  be removed once the communards had moved over to communal dining.
    The De-Urbanists were fired by a wholly différent vision : to empty the cities
    and spread families and individuals around the countryside in portable, mobile,
    and prefabricated homes. Like the Urbanists, they allowed for fluid family relations  in a society where divorce was extremely easy : the portable units, really room-sized  boxes on stilts, could be attached and detached in the event of marriage or divorce.
    Workplace, domestic services, and communal facilities (meeting halls, clubs, theaters)
    were to be within easy walking distance. In outward form, the schéme of the  De-urbanists was very much like American style suburbia of that era. Urbanists, De-Urbanists, proponents of linear cities, garden cities, non-cities, and renovated  cities jostled their ideas and plans in the bustling market place of utopian dreams  in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
    But the House Commune idea dissolved in an oceanie tide of urban in-migration  from the rural areas which rusticated the cities, eroded the citified idealism,and turned buildings designed as communes into collections of overcrowded « communal apartments » (kommunalnye kvartiry). The kommunalka, as it has been called since then, was a twisted parody of the communal idea, with whole families  stuffed into a room, with sometimes 30 people sharing hallway, bath, toilet, phone,kitchen, and entryway. A British observer in Moscow noticed in the kitchen of an eight-room, eight-family apartment (formerly occupied by one family), eight  separate cupboards and eight ranges on the « communal » stove for eight separate  préparations (by eight wives of course) of eight privately consumed meals6 . So  it has been in the inner-city « communal » apartment ever since.
    New cities were certainly built in the 1930s, many of them enormous, particularly
    at the industrial sites. But the living schemes – the utopias of space — of  the Urbanists and De-Urbanists almost never got off the ground — or onto the  ground. In the early 1930s, utopian town planners were repudiated by the régime  as dangerous dreamers : Urbanists were called « Mensheviks » and De-Urbanists  « social fascists » — expletives much in the air at the time and having no earthly relationship to the ideas of these architects. Not only Stalin and his political henchmen  hated communes ; so did his enemies Trotsky, Bukharin, and others. No polls  were taken of the population, so we cannot know how it may háve taken to them.
    Spontaneous communards were always a small minority of the population, even in  the 1920s — Anarchists, Tolstoyans, sectarians, and a handful of urban communist  young people. From what we know the peasantry, who constituted the bulk of  the urban population in the mid 1930s, it is doubtful that it would hâve been much  interested in the elaborate fantasies of city planners and communal architects.
    But it is also doubtful that even under the right démographie and political  conditions Soviet urban utopias would hâve worked very well. Their designers did not address themselves much to problems of group psychology and human  personality. According to their approach, the environment and the reshaping of  productive relations would solve ail problems. Yet the associational frameworks  designed for communards might well hâve led to aliénation from the outside world  and to desiccation and boredom within. Their devices for multiplying and enriching  human contacts today sound rather drab and mechanistic : big dining rooms, group  discussions and lectures, entertainment and educational events, and dynamie inter  action in the enclosed pathways and winter gardens between buildings. But ail such  plans suffered from insufficient attention to the « communal personality » and
    ways of breeding it. Fourier and Chernyschevsky in the 19th century and kibbutz
    theorists today are far beyond them in this essential matter.

    (TO BE CONTINUED)

    RICHARD STITES

    notes

    1. E. Poletaev and N. Punin, Против цивилизации, 1916; Pg., 1918. i am indebted to
    Charles Rougle of Stockholm University for this work.
    2. K. Johansson and Charles Rougle, « Express : the future according to Gastev », in
    L. Kleberg and Stites, eds., Utopia in Russian history, culture, and thought, spécial issue of
    Russian history , 1984 ; Johansson, Aleksej Gastev, Stockholm, 1983.

    3. M. V. Frunze, Избранные произведения, M., 1934, p. 192-201. For current interpré
    tations, see W. Odom, « The ‘militarization of Soviet society1 », Problems of Communism, XXV  (sept.-oct. 1976), p. 34-51.
    4. Among the best récent works are : A. Kopp, Changer la vie – changer la ville, Paris,
    1975 ; id., Town and révolution, New York, 1970 ; N. A. Miljutin, Sotsgorod, Cambridge,
    Mass., 1974 ; S. F. Starr, Melnikov, Princeton, 1978 ; id., « Visionary town planning during
    the cultural révolution », in S. Fitzpatrick, éd., Cultural révolution in Russia, 1928-1931,
    Bloomington, 1975 ; M. Bliznakov, « Urban planning in the USSR », in M. Hamm, éd., The city  in Russian history (Lexington, Kentucky, 1976).

    5. For the background, see Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia, Prince
    ton1, 978, p. 258-269, 409410.
    6. E. D. Simon et ai, Mosco w in the making. London. 1937. p. 143-172.

    SOURCE

    Stites Richard. Utopias of time, space, and life in the Russian Revolution. In: Revue des études slaves, Tome 56, fascicule 1,
    1984. L’utopie dans le monde slave. pp. 141-154.
    http://www.persee.fr/

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    Ορφικά Μυστήρια

    «Ο Ορφεύς στάθηκε το έμψυχο πνεύμα της Ιεράς Ελλάδος, ο αφυπνισμός της θείας ψυχής».
    Πράγματι, τα Ορφικά Μυστήρια κυριάρχησαν για μεγάλο χρονικό διάστημα στον αρχαίο κόσμο και κατέχουν ξεχωριστή θέση ανάμεσα στις αρχαίες Ελληνικές τελετουργίες.

    Ιδρυτής των μυστηρίων θεωρείται ο Ολύμπιος Ορφεύς, υιός του Οιάγρου και της Μούσας Καλλιόπης. Γεννήθηκε στην Πίμπλεια της Πιερίας την 13-14η χιλιετία π.Χ. και υπήρξε μία ιδιαίτερα πολυσχιδής προσωπικότητα: λέγεται ότι έλαβε μέρος στην Αργοναυτική Εκστρατεία, ότι εφηύρε την λύρα και ήλθε σε επαφή με τους Καβείρους της Θράκης από τους οποίους επηρεάστηκε.
    Επίσης παροιμοιώδης έμεινε ο έρωτας του για την Ευρυδίκη για την οποία κατέβηκε ως τον Άδη για να την πάρει πίσω από το βασίλειο του Πλούτωνα. Η συνολική θεώρηση των Ορφικών αποδεικνύει πως ο Ορφέας ήταν όντως υπαρκτό πρόσωπο και όχι απλά το αποκύημα της φαντασίας ορισμένων.

    Τα Ορφικά Μυστήρια ξεκίνησαν από τα Βορειοελλαδικά βουνά, σε μια εποχή που ο Διόνυσος ο κατ’ εξοχήν Θεός των μυστηρίων, λατρευόταν σαν Θεότητα της Σελήνης (Φεγγαροθεός). Δημιουργώντας τα Μυστήρια ο Ορφέας ένωσε τη θρησκεία του Δία με εκείνη του Διονύσου.
    Οι μυημένοι έπαιρναν από τις διδασκαλίες του τις μεγάλες αλήθειες που το θαυματουργό τους Φως έφτανε μέχρι το λαό με την μορφή ενός πέπλου προσιτού και ανακατεμένου με την ποίηση και τις δημόσιες τελετές. Μεγάλος Ιερέας του Δια και εξέχων Μύστης της Θράκης, ο Ορφέας έγινε για τους μυημένους ο μεγάλος Αποκαλυπτής του Ουρανίου Διονύσου.
    Οι τελετές των Ορφικών λάμβαναν μέρος την νύκτα. Η ουσία των Μυστηρίων είναι η μετάβαση από το σκότος στο φως με διάφορους αλληγορικούς και συμβολικούς τρόπους.
    Στο άδυτο του ναού ο Ιεροφάντης άναβε την τελετουργική Πυρά από μία συνεχώς καίουσα Ιερά Πηγή και εμφανιζόταν μπροστά στους μυημένους. Οι ναοί των Ορφικών είτε ήταν κτιστοί, είτε απλά σπήλαια.
    Ένα άλλο μέρος της Ορφικής φιλοσοφίας αποτελούν και οι Ορφικοί Ύμνοι που ψάλλονταν κατά τις τελετές.
    Είναι πανάρχαιοι και οι παλαιότεροι ανάγονται στην 11η χιλιετία π.Χ. Εξυμνούν διάφορες θεότητες και δίνουν πλήθους στοιχείων για την Ορφική Κοσμολογία, όπως: την γέννεση του Σύμπαντος από μια έκρηξη, την θεωρία του Κοσμικού Ωού (άποψη πως ο κόσμος γεννήθηκε από ένα αυγό), την πίστη στην Συμπαντική Αρμονία, την αναφορά στο Ζωδιακό Κύκλο, καθώς και πλήθος αστρονομικών γνώσεων όπως την ύπαρξη του Πολικού Αστέρα, τις Ισημερίες και τα Ηλιοστάσια.
    Η Αρχαία Ελληνική Θεολογία προήλθε από τους Ορφικούς και επηρέασε τόσο τον Πυθαγόρα όσο και τον Πλάτωνα. Ο Πλάτων μάλιστα στα κείμενα του ονομάζει τον Ορφέα «Θεολόγο».

    Ο λόγος του Ορφέα λοιπόν προχώρησε μετά τον θάνατό του με τρόπο μυστηριώδη μέσα στις φλέβες του Ελληνισμού από τις μυστικές αρτηρίες των Ιερών και τον έκανε Μύστη.
    Οι Θεοί έμειναν σύμφωνοι με τον λόγο του, όπως μέσα σε έναν ναό ο χορός των μυημένων συμφωνεί με τους ήχους μιας αόρατης λύρας. Έτσι η ψυχή του Ορφέα έγινε η ψυχή της Ελλάδος.

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    Pagan Christs (PART Θ)

    …you take the blue pill–the story ends…you take the red pill…and I show you how deep the rabbit hole goes. –

    Morpheus in The Matrix

    (BEING CONTINUED FROM  17/08/2014)

    § 2. Reform as a Religious Process.

    The case may become clearer if we look for illustration to the phenomena of fictitious literature. It will hardly be suggested that the Semites and Greeks who wrote religious treatises or hymns and ascribed them to famous men of centuries before, were under a hallucination as to the source of their thoughts. They did but seek for them the passport of a name that challenged respect. Precisely, then, as the “prophetic” writer put his words in the mouth of a dead prophet (a common way of aiming at reforms), making him say, “Thus saith the Lord,” so in many cases at least the living prophet must have been perfectly conscious that his spoken words were “not the Lord’s, but his own.” In fact, the saner the prophet, and the saner his counsel, the more likely was he to know how he came by it; though his feeling that he was on the side of the God would greatly relieve his scruples about professing to be the God’s mouthpiece. The man who, on the other hand, was so far beside himself as to suppose that Omnipotence was speaking through him, was much less likely to have wise counsels to give. In any case, crazed or prudent, right or wrong, all alike ran the risk of being denounced by the others as “false prophets,” 2 and stoned accordingly. Thus reform was a matter either of persuading kings or of managing fellow-priests and fellow-worshippers; and genius for management would be fully as important as genius for righteousness.

    In the case, for instance, of a substitution of animal for human sacrifices, or of dough-dolls for sacrificial animals or men or children,

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    the reformer of a priest-ruled cult had to play at once upon the credulity and the self-interest of the worshippers. It is clear from the Hebrew books that for the early Hebrews as for the Phœnicians the first-born of man as well as of animals was at one time a customary sacrifice; 1 and the myth of Abraham and Isaac confesses the fact in the act of supplying a pretext for a change. In the story of the sacrifice of Jephthah’s daughter, again, it is evident that human sacrifice must once have been normal to permit of the idea of the application of the vow to a human being; and the declaration that a special annual mourning was set up for the alleged tragedy of mischance is an ethical fiction. In all likelihood the ground of it was an annual sacrifice of a maiden, which was transmuted into an act of lamentation for one traditionally sacrificed. So with the obvious fiction of Joshua’s imprecating on the rebuilder of Jericho the curse of slaying his sons for the foundations: 2 the practice had clearly been normal, and the representing of it as a foredoomed horror is a late invention. And no less clear is it, from the story of the sacrifice of a virgin imposed by the Delphic Oracle on the Messenians in their war with the Spartans, 3 that the practice, wherever it originated, was religiously established among the early Greeks.

    Such story-telling as that of the Isaac myth, and that of the suicide of the despairing Aristodemus, convinced that he had slain his daughter in vain, 4 was the natural device 5 of the humane reformer, who was much more likely to be relatively a rationalist than to be abnormally subject to religious ecstasies or trances. Mohammed is indeed a case to the contrary, he being credited with opposing the practice of female infanticide; but the very fact that in the Koran no tale is framed to carry the point is a confirmation of our view. In an old cult, a bald command to forego or reverse an established rite would be bewildering to the worshippers, whereas a myth describing a process of commutation would find easy acceptance where such a commutation was already agreeable to normal feeling.

    Normal feeling, on the other hand, was often the matrix of the

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    reformative idea. There was a natural tendency to relax human sacrifices in times of prosperity unless a zealous priesthood insisted on them; 1 and a long period of prosperity would make men loth to shed the blood of their own children. Thus either the political accident of a prolonged peace or the opening of a new era of government was the probable condition of the effectual arrest of child-sacrifice among the Hebrews; and the myth of Abraham and Isaac and the ram was in all likelihood framed at such a time. Its inclusion in a sacred book was some security against such a reversion to child-sacrifice as we know to have occurred among the Carthaginians in times of great distress or danger, after periods in which it was disused. 2 The same tendency is implied in the story—whether true or false—of a cannibal sacrament among the members of the conspiracy of Catiline. 3 Nations, like men, are apt to be driven to worse courses by terror and disaster; 4 and it is not only conceivable but probable that the Hebrews made their main steps towards religious betterment when they were temporarily razed from the list of the nations and set to cultivate their religious consciousness in a captivity which withheld them from political vicissitude without reducing them to slavery. 5

    For the explanation of religious evolution, then, we must look not so much to genius for right thought as to genius for hitting the common taste or for outmaneuvering rival cults. By far the clearest case of cult- or creed-shaping by a single genius is that of Mohammed; 6

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    and here, to the historical eye, it is the political expansion of Islam at a critical moment that makes the fortunes of the faith, not the rise of the faith that makes the fortune of the Moslems. Had not the Saracens at the moment of the successful emergence of Mohammed’s movement found their chance to overrun great territories of the enfeebled Christian empire, that movement might never have been aught but an obscure tribal worship, or might indeed have been speedily overlaid by the surrounding polytheism. It was the sense of triumphant opposition to Christian tritheism and Mary-worship and to Persian fire-worship that sharply defined the Moslem dogma; and once a religion has its sacred book, its tradition of triumph, and its established worship, the conservatism of the religious instinct counts for much more in preserving it than the measure of genius that went to the making of its doctrine. Every religion, in fact, sees supreme genius, both literary and religious, in its own Bible simply because it is such. No Christian can have a devouter conviction of the splendour of his sacred books than the Moslem enjoys concerning the Koran, the Brahman over the Vedas, or the Buddhist in respect of the large literature of his system.

    § 3. Polytheism and Monotheism.

    Broadly speaking, religious evolution is far from being a steady progress, and, such as it is, is determined in great measure by political and social change. It was certainly a political process, for instance, that established a nominal monotheism among the Hebrews in Palestine; even as it was a political process that established a systematic polytheism in other States. 1 Primarily, all tribes and cities probably tended to worship specially a God, ancestral or otherwise, who was the “Luck” of the community and was at first nameless, or only generically named. Later comparison and competition evolved names; and any association of tribes meant as a matter of course a pantheon, the women of each taking their deities with them when they married into another clan. Ferocious myths and theological historiography in the Hebrew books tell amply of the anxiety of the priests of Yahweh at a comparatively late stage to resist this natural drift of things; and the history, down to the Captivity, avows their utter failure.

    Neither in the attempt nor in its failure is there anything out of the ordinary way of religious evolution. While some theorists (with Renan) credit Israel with a unique bias to monotheism, others,

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    unable to see how Israel could be thus unique, infer either an early debt to the higher monotheistic thought of Egypt or (with Ewald) an original reaction on the part of Moses against Egyptian polytheism. All three inferences are gratuitous. Renan’s thesis that a special bias to monotheism was set up in the early Semites by their environment is contradicted by all their ancient history, and is now abandoned by theologians. 1 The story of Moses in Egypt is a flagrant fiction; and “Moab, Ammon, and Edom, Israel’s nearest kinsfolk and neighbours, were monotheists in precisely the same sense in which Israel itself was” 2—that is to say, they too had special tribal Gods whom their priests sought to aggrandise. There is no reason to doubt that such priests fought for their Baals as Yahwists did for Yahweh. The point of differentiation in Israel is not any specialty of consciousness, but the specialty of evolution ultimately set up in their case through the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus.

    All the earlier Palestinian groups tended to be monotheistic and polytheistic in the same way. When tribes formally coalesced in a city or made a chief, a chief God was likely to be provided by the “paramount” tribe or cult, 3 unless he were framed out of the local fact of the city, or the mere principle of alliance. 4 In the case of the Hebrews, the cult of Yah, or Yahu, or Yahweh, was simply a local worship sometimes aggrandised by the King, and documentally imposed on the fictitious history of the nation long afterwards. 5 In the miscellaneous so-called prophecies ascribed to Jeremiah there is overwhelming testimony to the boundless polytheism of the people even in Jerusalem, the special seat of Yahweh, just before the Captivity. Either these documents preserve the historic facts or they were composed by Yahwists to terrorise yet a later generation of Hebrew polytheists. Not till a long series of political pressures and convulsions had eliminated the variant stocks and forces, and built up a special fanaticism for one cult, did an ostensible monotheism really hold the ground in the sacred city. 6

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    That this monotheism was “religious” in the arbitrary and unscientific sense of being neither ethical nor philosophical it might seem needless to deny; but the truth is that it represents the ethic of a priesthood seeking its own ends. The main thesis of the prophetic and historical books is simply the barbaric doctrine that Yahweh is the God of Israel, whom he sought to make “a people unto him; that Israel’s sufferings are a punishment for worshipping the Gods of other peoples; and that Yahweh effects the punishment by employing as his instruments those other peoples, who, if Yahweh be the one true God, are just as guilty as Israel. There is here, obviously, no monotheism properly so-called, even when the rival Gods are called non-Gods. 1 Such an expression does not occur in the reputedly early writings; and when first employed it is but a form of bluster natural to warring communities at a certain stage of zealotry; it is known to have been employed by the Assyrians and Egyptians as spontaneously as by the Hebrews; 2 and it stands merely for the stress of cultivated fanaticism in priest-taught communities. The idea that Yahweh used other nations as the “rod of his anger” against Israel and Judah, without desiring to be worshipped by those other nations, is a mere verbal semblance of holding him for the only God; and arises by simple extension of the habit of seeing a chastisement from the tribe’s God in any trouble that came upon it.

    Here we are listening to a lesson given by priests. On the other hand, the politic course of conciliating the Gods of the foe, practised by the senate-ruled Romans, tells of the grafting of the principle of sheer worldly or military prudence on that of general religious credulity in a community where priesthood as such was but slightly developed. Morally and rationally speaking, however, there is no difference of plane between the Roman and the Hebrew conceptions. 3 Jeremiah, proclaiming that “the showers have been withheld” by “the Lord that giveth rain,” 4 is on that side, indeed, at the intellectual level of any tribal medicine-man; and if the writers of such doctrine could really have believed what their words

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    at times implied, that the alleged one sole God desired the devotion of Israel alone, leaving all other peoples to the worship of chimæras, they would have been not above but below the intellectual and moral level of the professed polytheists around them.

    On any view, indeed, they were morally lower in that they were potentially less sympathetic. So far as can be historically gathered, the early monotheistic idea, so-called, arose by way of an angry refusal to say, what the earlier Yahwists had constantly said and believed, that other nations had their Gods like Israel. There is thus only a quibbling truth in the thesis that monotheism does not grow out of polytheism, but out of an “inchoate monotheism” which is the germ of polytheism and monotheism alike. 1 The “inchoate monotheism” in question being simply the worship of one special tribal God, is itself actually evolved from a prior polytheism, for the conception of a single national God is relatively late, and even that of a tribal God emerges while men believe in many ungraded Gods. It is quite true that later polytheism arises by the collocation of tribal Gods; but there is absolutely no known case of a monotheism which did not emerge in a people who normally admitted the existence of a multitude of Gods. Even, then, if the first assertors of a Sole God were so in virtue of a special intuition, that intuition was certainly developed in a polytheistic life. And there is absolutely no reason to doubt, on the other hand, that in Israel as elsewhere there were men who reached monotheism by philosophic progression from polytheism.

    The historic evolution of Jewish monotheism, however, was certainly not of this order. It was not even, as Robertson Smith with much candour of intention implied, “nothing more than a consequence of the alliance of religion with monarchy.” 2 Monarchy in Mesopotamia and Egypt never induced monotheism; and most of the Jewish kings were on the face of the record polytheists. The development, as we shall see, was post-monarchic and hierocratic; and the immediate question is whether the spirit which promoted it was either morally or intellectually superior. The judicial answer must be that it was not. Insofar as it was a sincere fanaticism, a fixed idea that one God alone was to be recognised, though he devoted himself to one small group of men, it partook of the nature of mono- mania, since it utterly excluded any deep or scrupulous reflection on

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    human problems; and insofar as it was not fanatical it was simply the sinister self-assertion of priests bent on establishing their monopoly.

    The contrary view, that a belief in the existence of the Gods of other tribes than one’s own is “obviously” a “lower form of faith than that of the man who worships only one god and believes that as for the gods of the heathen, they are but idols,” 1 must just be left to the strengthening moral sense of men. Such an assumption necessarily leads, in consistency, to the thesis that the man who believes his tribe has the One God all to itself does so in virtue of a unique “revelation”; and this is implied in the further description of true monotheism as proceeding on an “inner consciousness that the object of man’s worship is one and indivisible, one and the same God always.” On this basis, sheer stress of egoism is the measure of religiosity; and as the mere scientific reason cannot suppose such egoism to have been a monopoly of the Hebrews, it would follow, for ordinary minds, that revelation occurred in every separate cult in the world. It is indeed certain that even among polytheists a special absorption in the thought of one God is a common phenomenon. 2 Thus there are as many revelations as there are Gods and Goddesses, all alike being vouched for by the “spiritual depths of man’s nature.”

    Unless rational thought is once more to be bridled by absolutism, such a line of reasoning must be classed with the pretensions of the medieval papacy. Men not already committed to dogma cannot conceive that a religion is to be appraised in utter disregard of its relation to universal morals, on a mere à priori principle as to the nobility of monotheism—especially when the principle is set up for one monotheism alone. It is merely a conventional result of the actual course of the evolution of the Christian system that quasi-monotheism as such should be assumed to be an advance on other forms of creed, with or without exception of the case of Islam. A certain intellectual gain may indeed arise where a cult dispenses with and denounces images; this, even if the variation arose, as is likely, not by way of positive reasoning on the subject, but by the simple chance of conservatism in a local cult which had subsisted long without images for sheer lack of handicraftsmen to make them. 3

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    [paragraph continues] But the gain is slight indeed when the anthropomorphic idea of the God’s local residence is stressed exactly as his imaged presence is stressed elsewhere, and when in every other respect his worship and ethic are on the common anthropomorphic level. 1 In any case it is clear that such monotheism could not be made by mere asseveration, with or without “genius,” to prevail against the polytheism of a population not politically selected on a monotheistic basis.

    Even if it were, however, it would depend on further and special causes or circumstances whether the worshippers underwent any new moral development. 2 The conventional view unfortunately excludes the recognition of this; hence we have the spectacle of a prolonged dispute 3 as to whether savage races can ever have the notion of a “Supreme Being” or “Creator” or “High God,” or “All Father,” with the assumption on both sides that if the affirmative can be formally made out the savages in question are at once invested with a higher intellectual and spiritual character—as if a man who chanced to call his God “High” and “Good” thereby became good and high-thinking. 4 All the while Mr. Lang, the chief champion of the affirmative, avows that his Supreme-Being-worshipping savages in Australia would kill their wives if the latter overheard the “high” theistic and ethical doctrine of the mysteries. 5 Even apart from such an avowal, it ought to be unnecessary to point out that terms of moral description translated from the language of savages to that of civilised men have a merely classifying force, and in themselves can justify no moral conclusion in terms of our own doctrines, any more than their use of terms like “Creator” can be held to imply a philosophical argument as to a “First Cause.” 6

    Two moral and intellectual tests at least must be applied to any

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    doctrine or cult of “monotheism” before it can be graded above any form of polytheism: we must know whether it involves a common ethic for the community of the worshipper and other communities; and whether it sets up a common ethic of humanity within the community. Either test may in a given case be partially satisfied while the other is wholly unsatisfied. Thus we have the pre-exilic Hebrews and (perhaps) some modern Australian aborigines 1 affirming a “One God” who is “Creator” of all, and yet treating all strangers as outside of the God’s providence or law; while on the other hand we had till recently the Khonds, with their human sacrifices to the Goddess Tari and their doctrine of a Supreme God, proclaiming that the victim whom they liturgically tortured or tore to pieces was sacrificed for “the whole world,” the responsibility for its welfare having been laid on their sect. 2 To set such “monotheism” or such Soterism above late Greek or Roman polytheism or Hindoo pantheism is possible only under an uncritical convention. 3 We must try Hebrew religion by moral tests if we are to grade it in a moral scale with others; and by such tests it is found to be anti-moral in its very monotheism. As for its records, we find its most impressive myths (to say nothing of the others) duplicated among some of the primitive tribes in India in our own day. One such tribe ascribes to a sacred bull the miracle of Joshua, the turning back of the sun in its course; another has a legend that is a close counterpart of that of the Exodus—the dividing of the waters by the God to enable the tribe to escape a pursuing king. 4

    Genius, no doubt, did arise in the shape of an occasional monotheist with both literary gift and higher ethical and cosmical ideals than those of the majority; and though there is reason to surmise lateness as regards the “prophetic” teachings of that order, 5 it is not to be disputed that such thinkers (whom Dr. Jevons would deny to be thinkers) may have existed early. But the broad historic fact remains that by the ostensibly latest prophet in the canon Yahweh is represented as complaining bitterly of the frauds committed on him in the matter of tithes and sacrifices. “Offer it now unto thy governor: will he be pleased with thee?” he is made to say concerning the damaged victims brought to his altar. 6 And the very prophet of the Restoration lays down, or is made to lay

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    down, the old doctrine of the tribal medicine-man very much in the language of a modern company-promoter:—

    And it shall come to pass that every one that is left of all the nations which came against Jerusalem shall go up from year to year, to worship the King, the Lord of hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles [more correctly booths].

    And it shall be that whoso of all the families of the earth goeth not up unto Jerusalem to worship the King, the Lord of hosts, even upon them there shall be no rain.

    And if the family of Egypt go not up, and come not, neither shall it be upon them; there shall be the plague [or upon them shall be the plague] wherewith the Lord will smite the nations that go not up to keep the feast of tabernacles. 1

    If this were the whole or the principal historical clue to the motives of the Return, we should be moved to decide that that movement was simply a sacro-commercial venture, undertaken by men who had seen how much treasure was to be made by any shrine of fair repute for antiquity and sanctity. The other records, of course, enable us to realise that there entered into it the zeal of a zealous remnant, devoted to the nominal cult of their fathers’ city and the memories of their race. But with such a document before us we are forced to recognise, what we might know from other details in sacerdotal history to be likely, that with the zealots there went the exploiters of zealotry. It is certain that the men of the Return were for the most part poor: a Talmudic saying preserves the fact that those who had done well in Babylon remained there; 2 and, on the other hand, it holds to reason that among the less prosperous there would be some adventurers, certainly not unbelievers, but believers in Mammon as well as in another God.

    Such men had abundant reason to believe in Yahweh as a source of revenue. The prophetic and historic references to him as a rain-giver are so numerous as to give a broad support to Goldziher’s theory that the God of the Hebrews had been a Rain- God first and a Sun-God only latterly; and in sun-scorched Syria a God of Rain was as sure an attraction as the Syrian Goddess herself, who in Lucian’s day had such treasure-yielding prestige. But even if we ignore the economic motive, obvious as it is, the teaching of Zechariah remains undeniably tribalist and crassly unedifying. To such doctrine as this can be attributed neither the

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    intellectual nor the moral advantages theoretically associated with monotheism in culture-history. It is historically certain that science never made in Jewry any such progress as the monotheistic conception has been supposed to promote; and whatever general elevation of moral thought may have taken place among the teachers of later Jewry is clearly to be ascribed not to a fortuitous upcrop of genius—though that was not absent—but to the chastening effect of disaster and frustration, forcing men to deep reverie and the gathering of the wisdom of sadness. And to this they may have been in a measure helped by the higher ethical teachings current among their polytheistic conquerors and neighbours. There emerges the not discomforting thought that it is from suffering and the endurance of wrong, not from triumph and prosperity, that men have reached an ideal in religion which renounces all the egoisms of race and cult. Such an experience could have come to other victims of Babylon, brought within the Babylonian world before the Jews. But the trouble was that only there could a wisdom of self-renunciation subsist in any communal shape: in the Hebrew books, however introduced, it was forever doubled with the lore of savagery and tribalism, the worst religious ethic always jostling the best.


    (TO BE CONTINUED)

    by John M. Robertson
    [1911]


    Footnotes

    63:2 Cp. Jeremiah xxvi, 11; xxvii, 9-10; xxviii, 1-17; xxix, 8, 9, etc.

    64:1 Cp. Exod. xiii, 2; xxxiv, 20; Lev. xxvii, 28-29; Numb. iii, 41; xviii, 15.

    64:2 Josh. vi, 26; 1 Kings xvi, 34. It is not unlikely that the sons of King Hiel were sacrificed to the God Joshua. See below, Pt. II, ch. i, § 10.

    64:3 Pausanias, iv, 9.

    64:4 Paus. iv, 13.

    64:5 Compare the myth (Apollodorus, iv, 3, § 2) of the kid substituted for the child Dionysos by Zeus to save him from Hêrê (a myth with a purpose) and that of the bull substituted for a man in sacrifice by the intervention of the Khond God Boora (Macpherson, Memorials of Service in India, 1865, p. 109). There is reason to surmise that the story of Perseus and Andromeda may derive from a similar suppression of a sacrificial rite. Cp. Frazer, Lectures on the History of Early Kingship, 1905, pp. 182, 184.

    65:1 See below, Part IV, as to the Aztecs; and cp. Prof. Granger, The Worship of the Romans, 1895, p. 300.

    65:2 Diodorus Siculus, xx, 14; Plutarch, De Superstitione, end; Regum et imper. apophthegmata: Gelon, f; Porphyry, De Abstinentia, ii, 56; Plato, Minos, p. 315 C.; Justin, xvii, 6; Varro, in Augustine, De civ. Dei, vii, 19. Cp. Macpherson, Memorials of Service in India, pp. 113-115, as to special pressures. The many wars and straits of the Carthaginians is the reasonable explanation of their reversion to child-sacrifice at a time when it had been long disused in Tyre. See F. W. Newman (Miscellanies, 1869, p. 302) as to the case of Tyre (Quintus Curtius, iv, 3, § 38). Prof. Newman, in throwing doubt on the statement of Diodorus, does not note the testimony of Plato, Plutarch, and Porphyry; and in doubting Pliny’s story (Hist. Nat. xxxvi, § 4, 26 [12]) of an annual sacrifice to Hercules he does not note Porphyry’s account of the sacrifice at Rhodes. See below, Part II, ch. i, § 4.

    65:3 Plutarch, Cicero, 10. Sallust (Cat. 22) expresses doubt; but on the point of probability cp. Merimée, Études sur l’histoire romaine, 1844, ii, 113-116.

    65:4 Cp. Plutarch, Marcellus, 3.

    65:5 Professor Huxley, in his much over-pitched account of the monotheism and the ethic of the Jews (discussed below), expressly ascribes the special development to “a vigorous minority among the Babylonian Jews.” Cp. I. Sack, Die altjüdische Religion im Uebergange vom Bibelthume zum Talmudismus, 1889, pp. 25-27.

    65:6 Precisely here, nevertheless, Dr. Jevons refuses to recognise progress, though the establishment of monotheism is in terms of his own doctrine a great progressive achievement. “Polytheism may in some few civilised peoples rise towards pantheism, but in most cases degenerates into fetishism; monotheism passes in one case from Judaism into Christianity, but in another into Mohammedanism” (p. 395). This though Mohammedanism is by far the stricter monotheism of the two, and though Mohammedanism resisted magic and divination, which the Rabbis had maintained. (Cp. Davies, Magic, Divination, and Demonology, pp. 41 sq., 64 Mohammed’s 74-89). Dr. Jevons is here in company with Prof, Robertson Smith, who argues that Mohammed’s claim to have knowledge of a past historic episode “by direct revelation,” a claim never made by “the Bible historians,” is “to thinking minds one of the clearest proofs of Mohammed’s imposture” (The Old Testament in the Jewish Church, 2nd ed. p. 141, note). What the Professor thought of the Hebrew claim to have knowledge of future history by direct revelation is thus hard to divine. Cp, p. 283, and p. 161, note.

    66:1 See below, § 4-7.

    67:1 Cp. Prof. Karl Marti, Gesch. der Israelit. Relig. 1907. p. 23.

    67:2 Wellhausen, Israel, in vol. with tr. of Prolegomena, p. 440. Cp. Marti, as cited, p. 64.

    67:3 Cp. Jevons, p. 391.

    67:4 E.g. “the covenant God” in Jud. ix, 46.

    67:5 Cp. Joshua xxiv, 2, 14, 23, and the myth in Exodus vi, 3 (Heb.), where it is admitted early Israelites had worshipped El Shaddai. To speak of the “constant back-slidings” of the people, as Dr. Jevons still does, is but to revive the hallucination set up by the pseudo-history. There never was, before the exile, any true national monotheism to backslide from.

    67:6 Cp. Marti, as last cited. “Had, then, the Mosaic law no sort of authority in the had form of Judah—could it be transgressed with impunity? The answer is simple. It had force in so far as the king permitted to have any. It had no authority independently of him. It was never either proclaimed or sworn to.”—Kuenen, Lecture on The Five Books of Moses, Muir’s trans. 1877, p. 22. And even the assumption that there was a “Mosaic law” is open to challenge.

    68:1 E.g., Jer. v, 7. As Kuenen notes (Religion of Israel, Eng. tr. i, 51-52), such passages are few in the prophetic books. In Hosea xiii, 4, there is no such implication; and the “non-God” passages are all presumptively late. The Aramaic verse, Jer. x, 11, is an interpolation; and the whole chapter is relatively late.

    68:2 Cp. Isa. x, 16-11; 2 Kings, xviii, 33-35; Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, p. 129; Tiele, Histoire comparée des anciennes religions, Fr. trans. pp. 243, 247.

    68:3 Gladstone, it will be remembered, confessed that the ethic of the early Hebrews is below that of the Achæan Greeks. Landmarks in Homeric Study, p. 95. If, indeed, we could believe the awful tales of God-commanded massacres told in the Hexateuch, we should have to place the “Mosaic” Hebrews on a level with the most cruel savages of whom we have any record. The priests who compiled these hideous fables were doing their best to sink Hebrew life and morals far below the plane of those of Babylon.

    68:4 Jer. iii. 3; v, 24.

    69:1 This argument of Dr. Jevons (pp. 385-7) is a revival of an old thesis. “Monotheism and polytheism,” writes J. G. Müller (Amerik. Urrelig. p. 19), “diverge not through grade the Godhead but through difference of principle, through the primarily different relation to the Godhead. From polytheism nations emerged not by mounting on the same ladder, by leaving it, by the inception of a new spiritual force (Geistes schöpfung).”

    69:2 Religion of the Semites, p. 74.

    70:1 Jevons, p. 387.

    70:2 Cp. Max Müller, Introd. to Science of Relig. ed. 1882, pp. 80-81; Tiele, Egypt. Relig., pp. 33, 223; Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 89, 90, 96, 97, 100, 108, 109.

    70:3 That Yahweh was, however, imaged in northern Israel as a young bull—a symbolic form common to him and Moloch—is beyond doubt. Cp. Kuenen, Religion of Israel, 1, 235-6. Here the Yahwists probably adopted images made by more advanced races. Cp. on the other hand Goldziher’s theory that the early Hebrews worshipped the night sky and the cloudy sky—objects not adaptable to images (Mythology among the Hebrews, Eng. tr. pp. 220-227).

    71:1 The barbarous Khonds, who till recently practised human sacrifice, rejected both images and temples as absurd; and the cults of the Maories, though not imageless, as is stated by Macpherson (Memorials of Service in India, p. 102), made small account of images as such. They were in fact treated as being in themselves nothing, being “only thought to possess virtue or peculiar sanctity from the presence of the God they represented when dressed up for worship” (Rev. R. Taylor, Te Ika a Maui, 1870, pp. 211-214). They were thus in the strict sense fetishes. But the Khonds are without durable houses (Id. p. 61); and they and the Maories alike were of course backward in the arts. In Fiji a similar state of things prevailed (Seeman, in Galton’s Vacation Tourists, 1862, p. 269). As to the Vedic Aryans there is debate, Max Müller holding them to have had no idols (Chips, i, 38), while Muir cites texts which seem to imply that they had them (Original Sanskrit Texts, v. 453-4).

    71:2 Prof. A. Réville, a monotheist and semi-Christian, avows that “nous trouvons en plein paganisme une obscure et grossière tendance au monothéisme. On pressent que la divinité n’est, en réalité, ni masculine ni féminine, qu’elle possède les deux sexes ou n’en possède aucun. De là des symboles monstrueux, des mutilations, ou des impuretés indescriptibles” (Prolégomènes de l’histoire des religions, 3e édit. p. 172).

    71:3 See it carried on in Mr. Lang’s Magic and Religion, as against Dr. Tylor, who has latterly taken up the negative position. Mr. Lang’s thesis is discussed in the author’s Studies in Religious Fallacy, and in Christianity and Mythology, 2nd ed. pp. 46-68. Like that of Dr. Jevons, Mr. Lang’s view has much in common with the teaching of Prof. Max Müller, which is closely criticised by Mr. Spencer in App. B. to vol. i of his Principles of Sociology, Some of Mr. Spencer’s own arguments there are, however, open to rebuttal.

    71:4 “Good” was one of the epithets of Assur. Sayce, p. 124.

    71:5 Magic and Religion, p. 460

    71:6 Cp. Christianity and Mythology, 2nd ed. pp. 47-8.

    72:1 Lang, Making of Religion, pp. 190-8.

    72:2 Macpherson, Memorials of Service in India, pp. 98, 115, 116, 117, 122.

    72:3 Cp. Tiele, Hist. comp. des anciennes religions, Fr. trans. pp. 502-3.

    72:4 Thurston, Castes and Tribes of Southern India, 1909, iii, 221; y, 74-75.

    72:5 Cp. A Short History of Freethought, i, 104-9.

    72:6 Malachi, i, 8. Cp. i, 14; iii, 8-10.

    73:1 Zechariah xiv, 16-18. Compare the less explicit utterances of deutero-Isaiah (Isa. lx, etc.), which, however, imply no higher, conception of the relation of Judaism to the Gentiles.

    73:2 Prideaux, The Old and New Testaments Connected, Pt. i, B. iii.


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    ΟΜΗΡΙΚΟΙ ΥΜΝΟΙ (θ)

    (CYNECHEIA APO   01/19/14)

    Εις Ήφαιστον

    Ἥφαιστον κλυτόμητιν ἀείσεο, Μοῦσα λίγεια,
    ὃς μετ’ Ἀθηναίης γλαυκώπιδος ἀγλαὰ ἔργα
    ἀνθρώπους ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ χθονός, οἳ τὸ πάρος περ
    ἄντροις ναιετάασκον ἐν οὔρεσιν, ἠύτε θῆρες.

    νῦν δὲ δι’ Ἥφαιστον κλυτοτέχνην ἔργα δαέντες
    ῥηιδίως αἰῶνα τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
    εὔκηλοι διάγουσιν ἐνὶ σφετέροισι δόμοισιν.

    ἀλλ’ ἵληθ’, Ἥφαιστε: δίδου δ’ ἀρετήν τε καὶ ὄλβον.

     

    Εἲς Ἀπόλλωνα

    φοῖβε, σὲ μὲν καὶ κύκνος ὑπὸ πτερύγων λίγ’ ἀείδει,
    ὄχθῃ ἐπιθρώσκων ποταμὸν πάρα δινήεντα,
    Πηνειόν: σὲ δ’ ἀοιδὸς ἔχων φόρμιγγα λίγειαν
    ἡδυεπὴς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδει.

    καὶ σὺ μὲν οὕτω χαῖρε, ἄναξ, ἵλαμαι δέ σ’ ἀοιδῇ.

     

    Εις Ποσειδώνα

    ἀμφὶ Ποσειδάωτα, μέγαν θεόν, ἄρχομ’ ἀείδειν,
    γαίης κινητῆρα καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης,
    πόντιον, ὅσθ’ Ἑλικῶνα καὶ εὐρείας ἔχει Αἰγάς.
    διχθά τοι, Ἐννοσίγαιε, θεοὶ τιμὴν ἐδάσαντο,
    ἵππων τε δμητῆρ’ ἔμεναι σωτῆρά τε νηῶν.

    χαῖρε, Ποσείδαον γαιήοχε, κυανοχαῖτα,
    καί, μάκαρ, εὐμενὲς ἦτορ ἔχων πλώουσιν ἄρηγε.

     

    Εις Ύπατον Κρονίδην

    Ζῆνα θεῶν τὸν ἄριστον ἀείσομαι ἠδὲ μέγιστον,
    εὐρύοπα, κρείοντα, τελεσφόρον, ὅστε Θέμιστι
    ἐγκλιδὸν ἑζομένῃ πυκινοὺς ὀάρους ὀαρίζει.

    ἵληθ’, εὐρύοπα Κρονίδη, κύδιστε μέγιστε.

    Εις Εστίαν

    ἑστίη, ἥτε ἄνακτος Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο
    Πυθοῖ ἐν ἠγαθέῃ ἱερὸν δόμον ἀμφιπολεύεις,
    αἰεὶ σῶν πλοκάμων ἀπολείβεται ὑγρὸν ἔλαιον:
    ἔρχεο τόνδ’ ἀνὰ οἶκον, ἕν’ ἔρχεο θυμὸν ἔχουσα
    σὺν Διὶ μητιόεντι: χάριν δ’ ἅμ’ ὄπασσον ἀοιδῇ.

    (SYNECHIZETAI)

    Oι Ομηρικοί Ύμνοι αποτελούν μια συλλογή αρχαίων ελληνικών ύμνων σε μέτρο δακτυλικό εξάμετρο, το ίδιο που χρησιμοποιείται στην Ιλιάδα και την Οδύσσεια. Στην Αρχαιότητα, οι ύμνοι αυτοί αποδίδονταν στον Όμηρο: η πρώτη αναφορά σε αυτούς σε γραπτό κείμενο γίνεται από τονΘουκυδίδη (iii.104). Ορθώς ο Wolf στα PROLEGOMENA AD HOMERUM έβγαλε το συμπέρασμα ότι αυτοί οι ύμνοι χρησίμευαν στους ραψωδούς ως προεισαγωγή στις επικές απαγγελίες.
    Οι παλαιότεροι από αυτούς γράφτηκαν κατά τον 7ο αιώνα π.Χ. κι έτσι βρίσκονται ανάμεσα στα αρχαιότερα μνημεία της ελληνικής λογοτεχνίας. Παρά το γεγονός ότι οι περισσότεροι Ομηρικοί ύμνοι γράφτηκαν κατά την Αρχαϊκή περίοδο (7ος-6ος αιώνας π.Χ.), μερικοί θεωρούνται ως έργα της Ελληνιστικής Περιόδου.
    Οι ύμνοι ποικίλουν σε μέγεθος: κάποιοι είναι σύντομοι και τελειώνουν σε τρεις ή τέσσερις σειρές, ενώ άλλοι καλύπτουν μέχρι και πεντακόσιους στίχους. Οι μεγαλύτεροι ύμνοι περιλαμβάνουν επίκληση, εγκώμιο και αφήγηση, κάποιες φορές εκτεταμένη. Τα περισσότερα σωζόμενα χειρόγραφα από τα Βυζαντινά χρόνια ξεκινούν με τον Τρίτο Ύμνο. Μια τυχαία ανακάλυψη το 1777, στη Μόσχα, έφερε στο φως τους δυο ύμνους που βρίσκονται στην αρχή της συλλογής, τον Ύμνο προς το Διόνυσο και τον Ύμνο προς τη Δήμητρα. Περιέχονται σε ένα μοναδικό χειρόγραφο του 15ου αιώνα και σώζονται σε αποσπασματική μορφή.
    Οι 33 ύμνοι είναι αφιερωμένοι στους εξέχοντες θεούς της Ελληνικής μυθολογίας

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