GAZIS AND AKRITOI (7)

(BEING CONTINUED FROM 7/09/2016)

PART ONE:SOCIETY AND RELIGION

I. FRONTIER SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY ANATOLIA

A. Political Structure
Historians should consider the influence of geography, culture, economy, and politics on
religion as well as the influence of beliefs on the formers. To study the role of abdaldervishes in the early Ottoman society in a comprehensive manner one needs to draw the general picture of the region during the period under examination because of the close interrelation between religious beliefs and other social institutions and the
multidimensional lifestyle and functions of dervishes in their society.
It was Fuat Köprülü who first strongly emphasized the need for reconsideration
of the foundation of the Ottoman State as part of a more comprehensive historical
process, which includes the decline of Anatolian Seljuks and Byzantine Empire, Mongol
pressure from east, and from other Muslim States of the region, rather than taking it as
an isolated, single, and unique event.1 Sharing Köprülü’s view, it is I think more than
necessary to review the economic, social, political, military, and religious conditions of

the thirteenth century Anatolia in attempting to discuss the emergence of the Ottomans
as a regional power together with the factors operated in this process.
It is perhaps appropriate in this context to start by recalling of the fact that the
Ottomans were one of the frontier principalities which emerged in Western Anatolia in
the second half of the thirteenth century. After the zenith of their power under the rule of
Alaaddin Keykubat, Anatolian Seljuks experienced a serious popular revolt led by a sufi
sheikh Baba Ilyas in 1240. This revolt did not only shake the state but also unveiled the
fact that Anatolian Seljuk State was not as powerful as it was seen. As a consequence of
the Babai Revolt, Mongols invaded Asia Minor. They defeated Seljuks at Kösedağ in
1243, and became the real suzerain of Anatolia. Instead of totally destroying Anatolian
Seljuk State and finishing Seljuk Dynasty, Mongols made the Seljuks their tributepaying
vassals.
However, the rule of Mongols in Anatolia, particularly the western parts, saw a
strong resistance by the Turkish population of the region. They had been living, in
practice, under the rule of their beys, who were usually leaders of a tribe already in the
days of Seljuks. While the Seljuk State in Anatolia continued to decline in the later part
of the thirteenth century, new Turkish emirates began to crystallize in Anatolia. The
earliest and strongest of them was that of the Qaramanids, which emerged in western
Cilicia. Another important beylik formed in the western frontier of Anatolia was the
Germiyanids, which came into existence in the second half of the thirteenth century
around Kütahya. Fourteenth century sources portray Germiyanid beylik as a very strong
and important political entity in western Anatolia. The same sources also mention a
number of other beyliks recognized Germiyanid’s sovereignty, and even Byzantium paid annual tribute. The Aydınoğlus in Ionia, the Karasids in Mysia, and the Sarukhanids in
Lydia can be named among the Turkoman beyliks that were subject to Germiyanids at
least in their early periods. Moreover if we add the beyliks of the Hamids and Esrefids in
Psidia, the Jandarids in Paphlagonia, and the Ottomans in Bythinia to the list we would
more or less complete the picture of the most of the political formations in the second
half of the thirteenth century in western Anatolia2.
It is important to point out the fact that, these beyliks were not new political
entities that took form immediately on the ruins of the Seljuk State at the beginning of
the fourteenth century. But, these begliks became more independent political units after
the Mongol invasion. By taking advantage of the laxity and tolerance of the Mongol
Ilkhanid government in Iran, these principalities emerged gradually as local powers in
the second half of the thirteenth century. Due to the remoteness to the center of Ilkhanid
government, they found opportunity to behave independently in a certain degree. They
were, in fact, sub-vassals of the Mongols through still-formally-alive Seljuk government.
But this had never gone beyond theory. Though they were officially under the control of
the central authority of the Ilkhanid government and obliged to pay annual tribute to
them, in practice, they pursued semi-independent policies, which primarily concerned
their own benefits, and avoided to pay tax whenever they found opportunities. Some of
them, for example the Germiyanid, Menteshid, Aydinid, Karasid, and Ottoman beyliks,
were founded and expanded by conquering territories from Byzantine Empire, which
was already in decline. In that perspective, it is sufficiently clear that the location of a
beylik had decisive role, although not determinant, in determining its future. The advantageous ones in this respect were, of course, the begliks that were located in the
marches.
In the second half of the thirteenth century, at a time of turmoil where there was
not a strong political unity and stable government the people under a certain beg did not
necessarily belong to the same tribe. The social composition of the populace was made
mainly of newly-migrated Turkoman nomads belonging to different clans. Although one
can speak of certain borderlines between the lands of principalities, it was not rigid. The
social and ethnic structure, religious and economic conditions were more or less the
same in the territories of all principalities. They were from the same ethnic root3, namely
Turks, they were speaking the same language, they believed in the same religion, and
they had similar cultural traditions. The only considerable difference between two
begliks was their rulers. These conditions preserved a very dynamic and flexible ground
to a society, here semi-nomadic Turkoman groups who were already mobile and
vigorous to discover new lands for both their families and herds. Thus, these tribal
leaders who were successful in conquering new lands and in preserving the benefits of
their people, easily gathered a significant number of warriors, around themselves mostly
from the neighboring principalities. Ibn Battuta, an Arab traveler who toured western
Anatolia in the 1320s, depicts vividly this dynamic society and the landscape of political
fragmentation during this time.4

Osman, the bey of a small principality on the Byzantine border at the beginning,
emerged as a successful leader who lodged frequent raids into Byzantine lands and
reached considerable achievement. Osman Ghazi is mentioned for the first time in
Byzantine sources as the leader of these vigorous raids by Turkomans into the Byzantine
territory at the most advanced section of the territory at the turn of the fourteenth
century.5 Since the booty from infidels was a legal right for the “warriors of Islam”
according to the Islamic law, and constituted the main source of income for rootless
Turkoman raiders who soon turned to be “warriors for the faith”, it was not too difficult
for Osman to find men supply for his regular raids into Byzantine lands in Bythinia.
Barkan states that the scholars, who investigate the Ottoman success, should first
consider the massive Turkoman immigration from East under the Mongol pressure6.
Köprülü and Inalcık also underline the significance of this migratory pressure on all
political and social developments of the thirteenth and fourteenth century Anatolia.7
Although the main source of men supply for Ottoman troops was provided by
nomadic Turkomans, it should be noted that Osman, in the meantime, managed to
establish a certain degree of good relationships with local Christian population, which
were not so happy with the suppressive administration and heavy taxes of Byzantine
government. Especially villagers were in close contact with the Turkomans. Since
Osman did not collect heavy taxes from his subjects and promised protection from the
raids of Turkoman nomadic tribes; Byzantine soldiers, many Greek villagers found
Ottoman suzerainty more attractive than being Byzantine subject.

Another important topic that should be considered here is the ghaza, the holy war
against infidels. Islamic World experienced two crucial attacks in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. First was the Crusades, and the other was the invasion of pagan
Mongols. For Islam, to defend itself became a matter of life and death.8 This defensive
situation increased the popularity of jihad, war against infidels. In every corner of the
Islamic World, mücahids and ghazis, holy warriors, became the most respectful figures
in the society. It was obviously demonstrated in that even centuries later Ottoman
sultans used the title ‘sultanü’l- mücahidin’ and some other titles which had similar
meaning.
In the second half of thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century in the
western part of Asia Minor, the westernmost frontier region of the realm of Islam, the
idea of war against infidels was still alive in the public mind and highly credible in the
eyes of Muslim population. Therefore, for a bey as the leader of successive ghaza raids
in this period could open the doors to men flowing into his territories, thus strengthening
his fighting forces. Between 1330 and 1345 the most fruitful ghaza exploits in the
marches were achieved by Umur Bey of the Emirate of Aydınoğulları. Umur Bey
extended ghaza to naval engagements in Aegean Sea. But after the death of Umur in
1348 in an attempt to recapture Izmir from Christian forces, the new bey of Aydin,
Khidir, gave up the policy of ghaza, chosing to make peace with Christian states in order
to enjoy the benefits of trade. According to İnalcık, the leadership of ghaza then passed
to the Ottomans, who occupied the front line of the marches9. Then the ghazis started to
gather around the banner of the Ottomans. Especially Osman’s decisive victory in 1301 against Byzantine Imperial army in Baphaeon10, his fame spread further in the Islamic
World and ghazis flowed into his lands. Ottomans therefore became indisputable leader
of ghaza in the western frontier of the realm of Islam, which brought them enormous
prestige. Cantacuzenus, the Byzantine Emperor who chronicled the events of his time,
records that a bey embarking on a military expedition would willingly accept in his troop
warriors coming from neighboring principalities.11 They did not only use this prestige to
attract warlike elements from other Muslim lands, but also used it as a tool in
legitimizing their suzerainty over other Turkish dynasties. Whether the Ottomans
sincerely believed in Holy War and were pure ghazis or they used the Holy War
ideology in a pragmatic way is open to dispute.

B. Ethnic and Cultural Foundations

The appearance of the Mongols caused new wave of migration from the East. This
increased to a considerable degree the concentration of the Muslim Turkish population
especially in Anatolia since it was the westernmost area of Islamic realm, which also
provided relatively safer atmosphere for those exposed to the Mongol danger.
Contemporary sources refer to the fact that the Mongol Invasion did not only force the
nomadic elements to move westward. Along with them, not an insignificant number of
villagers, rich merchants, artisans, intellectuals, and wandering dervishes also moved to
Anatolia either to find a suitable place to settle or to provide their service to beys or  emirs who offered them the most. Western Anatolia in general attracted them mainly
because of its geographic position. Furthermore, the Seljuk state in Anatolia at the time
was a flourishing wealthy Muslim country with favorable living conditions.12 But after
the Mongol invasion and the consequent collapse of the Seljukid Dynasty, most of the
intellectuals, artisans, religious scholars, and other important figures of city dwellers
immigrated to the western cities, which were under the control of Turkoman beys. In his
seyahatname, Ibn Battuta records many examples of Turkoman beys’ patronage of
ulema, fukaha, and suara under their dominions.
Merchants, artisans, intellectuals and people from similar classes settled in
Anatoilan cities and flourished Islamic culture in those cities. In the religious circles in
cities the mainstream was sunni Islam under the influence of scholars from the heartlands
of Islam, namely ulema. But as for the nomadic tribes, central government
followed completely different policy, forcing them to move to western frontiers.
Actually this was advantageous for both sides: while the Seljukid administration wanted
to protect the urban population from the disturbance of nomads, the Turkoman tribes, on
the other hand, found immense pasturelands for their flocks in the western Anatolia,
where there was no strong political authority limiting their movements. According to
İnalcık, “the search for good pasturelands for their herds in marginal areas and the
opportunity for booty raids into neighboring Christian lands led many of the Turkoman
tribes to the mountain ranges in the remote frontier zones (udj). Pressed hard by the
Turkoman demands for yurt (a delimited area with summer and winter quarters) the
Seljukid central government hastened to drive them out toward the frontier areas, where they formed a large Turkoman belt in the northern, southern, and western mountain
ranges of Asia Minor”.13
In fact, the population was not merely composed of Turkish elements; there were
also groups of other elements, which came to Anatolia from different areas of Muslim
world for such reasons as the lust for adventure, profit, and fighting for Islam. But the
majority of Arabic and Persian elements, which were generally highly educated, settled
down in big cities and entered into high aristocracy. The majority of the Muslim
population in the marches however consisted of nomadic Turkoman tribes from several
clans of Oguz, which were highly dynamic and warlike.
The way of life in the principalities of marches clearly differed from that of the
hinterland. In the marches the culture was dominated by Islamic conception of Holy
War, ghaza, which also meant raids for booty. In the borderline there occurred frequent
clashes between the two sides. Ceaseless warfare produced warrior groups led by ghazi
leaders who were often blessed by sheikhs. Since the role of sufi sheikhs in weaving
ghaza ideology in the marches will be analyzed in the second part of this study. Thus, I
will not go into detail here.
Society in the marches was very mixed. It included highly mobile nomads,
refugees from central authority, heterodox elements, adventurers, and jobless
immigrants. In contrast to the highly developed conservative civilization of the
hinterland, marches were the center of mysticism, tolerance, flexibility, heterodox
beliefs, and romantic legends. Frontier culture was based on oral traditions rather than
written literature and the minds of people were being shaped by narration of legendary tales, which were usually stories of chivalrous heroes, and hagiographies called
vilayetname or menakıbname, in which the life and miracles of saints were told. People
were bound mostly by tribal or customary law. In short, the culture in marches was
intensely mystical and eclectic in nature and not yet become frozen into final form; and
it was highly dominated by the ghaza ideology. This can be clearly observed in the
fifteenth century Ottoman chronicler’s depiction of early Ottomans. One of them, for
example, Oruj narrates:
Ghazis and champions striving in the way of truth and the path of Allah,
gathering the fruits of ghaza and expanding them in the way of Allah, choosing
truth, striving for religion, lacking pride in the world, following the way of the
Shari’a, taking revenge on polytheists14, friends of strangers, blazing forth the
way of Islam from the East to the West.15
But one should immediately note at this point that in the process of the formation
of Turkoman beyliks, many relatively bigger cities emerged which became local centers
of Islamic culture by immigration of urban elite, such as intellectuals, artisans,
merchants, and religious scholars, from former important Seljukid cities, such as
Kayseri, Konya, Amasya etc. After the ghazi beys established control of the rich plains
and conquered international commercial ports, their emirates developed commercially
and culturally, and assumed the character of little sultanates, which gradually adopted
the higher forms of Islamic civilization.16 That can be seen in the accounts of al-Umari
and Ibn Battuta. Ibn Battuta admires the beautiful markets, palaces, and mosques in
these cities in the 1330s. Like other Anatolian Seljuk cities, these inflected by the
influence of Persian and Arabic culture especially in religious terms in the course of
time. The arrival of madrasa graduates from the major Muslim cities in Iran, Egypt, and Crimea and members of the Seljuk and Ilkhanid bureaucracies from central and eastern
Anatolia slowly led to the creation of cultural institutions in the march beyliks and to the
establishment of administrative apparatus. As the marches advanced, the life in the
villages and cities behind them also flourished, the population steadily increased, and
economic activity expanded.17

( TO BE CONTINUED)

NOTES

1 Fuat Köprülü, The Origins of The Ottoman Empire, trs. Gary Leiser, New York, 1992, pp. 1- 14.

2 Köprülü, p.38

3 Here I will not deal with the local Greek population, mainly living in villages, since their contributions to the contemporary political developments were not considerable.
4 Ibn Battuta was a qadi, Islamic judge, and narrates his voyage through lands of several Turkoman begs. There are some important points in his narration, which include valuable clues about the structure of  polity, society, culture, and religion among contemporary Turkish Muslims. For more information see Ibn  Battuta, İbn Batuta Seyahatnamesinden Seçmeler, haz. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara, 1999.

5 İnalcık, “The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State”, p.74.
6 Barkan, “Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri”, p. 284.
7 See Köprülü, The Origins; İnalcık, “The Question of the Emergence”; idem, “The Emergence of the   Ottomans”, Cambridge History of Islam, vol.I.

8 Halil İnalcik, ” Osmanlı Tarihine Toplu Bir Bakış” , Osmanlı, ed., Güler Eren, ankara, 1999, p.40.
9 İnalcık, “The Emergence”, p. 271.

10 For a broader reading about this battle see İnalcık, “Osman Ghazi’s Siege of Nicaea and The Battle of  Bapheus”, Essays in Ottoman History, Istanbul, 1998, 55-86.
11 İnalcik, “The Emergence of the Ottomans”, p.272.

12 Köprülü, “The Origins”, p. 45.
13 İnalcık, “The Question of the Emergence”, p. 72.

14 In that time they conceived Christians’ trinity as polytheism.
15 Oruj, Tavarikh-i Al-i Osman, ed. F. Babinger (Hanover, 1925), p.3.

16 İnalcık, ” The Emergence of the Ottomans”, p. 272.
17 Köprülü, p.83