(MEROS A)
ABSTRACT In the first part of the paper Castoriadis’ critical analysis of Plato’s Statesman2 is
discussed and the main points of this critique, chiefly the concealment of politics and democracy are
presented. The second part (which is followed by a short comparison of the projects of autonomy and
Inclusive Democracy) briefly deals with Castoriadis’ critique of contemporary political practice and
theory, and depicts the unveiling of politics and of democracy—views which are particularly
significant for us today.
1. Castoriadis’ analysis of Plato’s Statesman
Cornelius Castoriadis’ recount with the founder of Western metaphysics is
constant and abiding and in many of his texts Castoriadis challenges Plato’s views
and methodology, seeking to uncover and identify all the tenets of metaphysics.3
Castoriadis criticises Plato for distorting and falsifying basic Greek beliefs, not
only in the Statesman but also in his other works. In the Republic and the Laws, he
totally reverses the Greek conception of justice (p. 22). In other words, whereas the
question of justice (who is to give and what, and who is to have and what) remains
open within the polis and posits the question of distribution as an affair of
the citizens themselves, involves therefore the citizens in relations among
themselves, Plato reverses this in a holistic conception reducing it to property
of the whole. In other words, the ‘Republic’ is a well-ordered set, a
well-categorised whole where each item has its own place and does not attempt,
and must not attempt, to change.4
Plato is also the first to validate and justify the theory of inequality and
hierarchy that he bases on the supposedly different nature of each person, to
validate the division between classes in his Republic (p. 22). Certainly, within the
Greek ‘polis’, there are slaves and freemen, rich and poor, rulers and the ruled, but
Plato establishes and ratifies these divisions theoretically and philosophically.5
Another Platonic theory which is foreign to Greek thinking is his view of Being,
which he identifies with the good, while in Ancient Greek thinking Being is not
defined univocally, but in a dual sense as good and bad, cosmos and chaos.6
Plato also conceals the nature-law ( phusis-nomos) opposition, which
divides Greek thinkers and which was first postulated as such by the Sophists
in the mid-5th century in Athens. He imposes the order of the universe on
human affairs, thus concealing human creativity and the self-institution of society.
Thus, he becomes the author of ‘unitary ontology’, which is the expression of heteronomy.7
Plato also establishes and validates the immortality of the soul, a belief foreign
to the Greek imaginary, which from Homer up to the 4th century BC is dominated
by the belief that humans are mortal and the word mortal itself signifies humans.
In other words, for the Greeks there is nothing after death. Only the gods are
immortal. Immortality is introduced for the first time by Plato and to validate it he
has to banish from his Republic all talk of the bearer of mortality (i.e. Homer).
For Castoriadis, Plato is the total negation of Greek thought and indeed of
political thought, something that is clearly exemplified in his seminars on the
Statesman. In fact, Castoriadis’ critique shows the Platonic concealment and
distortion of important Greek beliefs, chiefly Greek beliefs concerning politics and
democracy. With an exhaustive analysis of the Platonic text he points out the
weakness of the arguments and accuses Plato of sophistry, rhetoric, theatricality,
lying, dishonesty, petitio principi and above all of bias (l’esprit partisan) in his
philosophy, which not only does not respect the different or opposite view and
does not address it with logical arguments, but diminishes and devalues it as
presumed lies or sophistry.
In the first place, Plato introduces the myth of the Golden Age of Cronos to
distort Democritus’ anthropogony,8 which was opposed to his own (p. 119).
Indeed, the theory of evolution of man and society prevailed in the 5th century,underpinned by the idea of human self-creation and the self-institution of society.
This idea is crystal clear and in Democritus’ the Mikro Diakosmos,9 it is the
rational view and is similar to the view we hold today: that in the beginning there
was a natural, wild, primitive state, whereby life was not ordered (sporadin)
without skills and basic measures of protection and gradually human beings
invented skills, became organised, created communities, institutions, language, in
other words they became social and political beings. Thus this conception accepts
gradual humanisation and the human evolutionary process, according to which
the xreia made people promithesterous kai provoulephtikoterous. We also find
this belief in other writers like Xenophanes10 and Protagoras.11
The opposite view expressed by Plato, not just in the Statesman but in other
works too12 and which has its origins in Hesiod13 states that there was a
Golden Age, of the reign of Cronos, according to which there was an abundance of
goods and happiness, there were no poleis, and women and children did not belong
to anyone. In the Golden Age the gods were herds of people who survived only
because of the gods. After the Golden Age of the reign of Cronos comes the reign
of Zeus, during which deterioration, disorder and decadence are introduced, but
the god returns, bearing skills for man, fire and so on, in sum all the wherewithal of
existence. In other words, all that was created by man—skills, poleis, institutions
and so on are represented by Plato not through evolution, not gradually, nor by a
regular historical process, but in cycles which repeat themselves, sometimes
straightly, sometimes reversely. Thus, Plato introduces a non-historical view with
the aim of bringing history to a halt. There is no history, there are only eternal
cycles which occur throughout time (p. 139).
Thus, Castoriadis concludes, what Plato does is to expropriate and transform the
anthropogony of the 5th century, suppresses its philosophical and political
meaning, the historical character which it had for Democritus and others,
thus concealing the idea of self-creation in humanity, so as to introduce the idea that everything is given to man by the gods.14 This is the most ‘cruel’
heteronomy.
Another basic premise of Plato in The Statesman and other dialogues (Republic)
is that the statesman is identified with the king. Here again Plato distorts and
violates accepted and widespread views in the Greek world. The identification of
the statesman with the king, which is arbitrary and unargumented ( petitio
principi), is unacceptable and outrageous for the Greeks, as for Athenians. In the
age when Plato wrote, there were no kings in Greece, except for two kings in
Sparta, who did not, however, have much power, since real power was exercised
by ephoroi and gerousia. Nor were the tyrants called kings in the Greek world.
As for the Macedonians, who had kings, they were not really part of what was
considered the Greek world, because first they spoke a Greek dialect, which
classified them as ‘barbarous’ as Dimosthenes publicly states, and moreover they
did not have poleis like the rest of the Greek world, but kings.15 When the Greeks
speak about kings in the 5th and 4th century BC, they mean one and only one
person, the megalo vasilea, the Persian king (p. 57).
The second identification of the statesman with the scientist, which is the main
point of The Statesman, is purely a Platonic invention and sophistry, according to
Castoriadis (pp. 57, 156). Political competence, for Plato, is achieved only by
the scientist and only science can determine the statesman and politics (292b).
The ‘science’ of politics is not for the many, the masses, but rather it is the
prerogative of the oligarchy and of the few, of the basilikou andros. This view of
Plato does not occur anywhere else in Greek classical writing, and conceals the
true character of politics: the conventional, empirical and predictable character of
political decisions, whereby it is not subject to ‘laws’, rules and constants, with
its rivalries and oppositions, its antagonisms and unrighteous methods. Plato
moves politics from the real to the theoretical and abstract, simultaneously
concealing the true conception of the Greeks concerning politics, which relates to
some knowledge and skill, practical and empirical. This view characterises
politics in the existing poleis—as well as numerous texts of other writers like
Heredotus, Thucydides, the tragics, Isocrates, Demosthenes and others.16
Similarly, in democracy, politics is the free conflict of opinions, free discussion
in the ekklesia tou dimou and voting by all citizens for the final decision
(bouleusis). In the democratic viewpoint there is—nor can there be, anyway—no
‘science’ of politics but only opinion (doksa) and because of this, it is the care,aim and definition of democracy that all citizens participate in the formation and
ratification of decisions, so that all are considered politically equal. In practice
this is expressed through participation in power, the real possibility all the
citizens have to participate in all forms of power. Political competence in
democracy is derived solely from experience in political matters, with free
discussion, true participation in political life and power and these lead to the
acquisition of true political education, true knowledge of political matters and of
the way in which society and power function.
The ‘Scientist’ statesman (o vassilikos anir) according to Plato must have
absolute power without any limit, must rule without laws, because he himself
is the law (294a). This view is also foreign, unthinkable for the Greek world
(pp. 145, 157). Greek writing and real political life advocate the importance
and stabilising role of laws from Heraclitus17 and Pindar18 to Herodotus19 and
Aristotle. Plato is rather the philosopher of the Hellenistic world and as such his
views were the theoretical basis and ideological safeguard of Hellenistic absolute
monarchies.20
(TO BE CONTINUED)
BY YORGOS OIKONOMOU
NOTES
1. Parts of this article are based on the paper I delivered at the international conference on
Cornelius Castoriadis ‘Cornelius Castoriadis and Social Theory’, University of Crete,
Department of Sociology, Rethymnon 29–30 September 2000. I would like to thank Rosalind
Jones for the translation. All references in the following footnotes refer to French editions,
except where stated otherwise. For the corresponding English texts see David Ames Curtis’ online
bibliography and the detailed references therein: www.agorainternational.org.
2. As in his seminars in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in 1986, which were
published in a book titled Sur Le Politique de Platon (Seuil, 1999). All page numbers in the
main text refer to this book.
3. However, Castoriadis acknowledges the great philosopher and the strength of the Platonic
philosophy, which consists of, among other things, the depth and manner of exposition of
problems, its inquiring character, the constant questioning it poses against its own positions, the
development of argumentation and rational reasoning (pp. 73–74). With particular reference to
the Statesman, Castoriadis believes it is a work in which we can see a great genuine thinker at
work, in the process of developing his thought, with no academicism or rules, with no concern
for structure and form.
4. Plato, Republic 2, 433a.
5. It is worth noting that Aristotle later tries to offer a theoretical justification of the institution of
slavery in Politics I.
6. Castoriadis, ‘La polis Grecque et la cre´ation de la de´mocratie’, Domaines de l’homme, p. 284.
7. ‘Ontologie unitaire’ (op. cit., p. 286).
8. Plato never refers to Democritus, in other words, as Castoriadis says, he condemns him to nonexistence
(damnatio memoriae).
9. DK B5, 1 and 3.
10. DK B18.
11. Plato Protagoras, 321a ff. The theory of Protagoras was perhaps included in his lost work Peri
tis en arxi katastaseos and it contends that in prehistoric times people did not have aidon kai
dikin, so they were unable to co-exist and also could not be protect themselves from wild
animals. They acquired these two ethico-political principles later and thus created polis and
civilisation.
12. Laws 4, 713a–714b (cf. also 3, 677b ff). The differences in the two versions of the myth are
noted by P. Vidal-Naˆquet (Le chasseur noir, p. 399). See also Castoriadis, “Transposition
platoniciene de l’age d’or”, in L’aˆge d’or ed. J. Poizier, figures libres 1996. Dikearchos also
refers to the golden age of Cronos, which, he claims, was an age of great abundance and
happiness that actually existed and is not just a myth. (See P. Vidal-Naˆquet, op. cit., p. 382 for
sources and relevant bibliography). This inverse route of humanity also occurs in the Cynics,
according to whom there first existed a natural state of happiness and then the poleis were
created where madmen (mainomenoi) ruled (Diog. Laer. VI 24, 41, 47, 49, 92). But the Cynics
do not accept that in the original natural state there was abundance of goods, but on the contrary,
penury, which did not, however, impede the self-sufficiency and ordered life of the people.
See A. Bayiona, La philosophie politique des Cyniques, Athens, pp. 50-52.
13. Erga kai Imerai, pp. 109–111.
14. Plato, The Statesman, 274c–d.
15. The Greek polis is based on the collective participation and responsibility of the citizens (see
P. Vidal-Naˆquet, op. cit., p. 399).
16. Aristotle makes the distinction between science, art and prudence ( phronesis) to state that what
characterises politics is not science but prudence, that is, the capacity for judgement and
orientation, the capacity for distinguishing the appropriate way to act from the inappropriate,
the useful from the harmful, the significant from the insignificant etc. Prudence for Aristotle and
for the Greeks generally, is to be found precisely where there is no science.
17. Fr. 103
18. ‘Law is the king of all, humans and gods’ (Herodotus III, 38).
19. The famous dialogue of Xerxes, with Dimaratus, the former king of Sparta. When before the
battle with the Greeks, Xerxes says that victory is certain because the Greeks do not have a
leader, Dimaratus answers that ‘you are wrong, because the Greeks in fact do have a leader, the
law, which they fear more than your people fear you’. (Herodotus VII, 104).
20. Finally Plato admits that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find a vassilikos anir in existing
reality and thus the polis must have to do with the smaller evil, laws, which have omissions and
shortcomings, and which he criticises vehemently (301e). This yielding to the laws is somewhat
of a contradiction with the final paragraph of The Statesman, where Plato returns to the royal
art, saying that it governs and controls the polis, weaving a tissue of all human types and skills,
in harmony and friendship keeping the polis stable and assuring its happiness. For the value of
the paradigm of weaving in today’s reality, see Couloubaritsis, ‘Le paradigme platonicien du
tissage comme modele politique d’une societe complexe’, Revue de philosophie ancienne, No 2
(1995), pp. 107–162.
This text has been published in the review
“Democracy and Nature”, Vol. 9, Nr. 2, July
2003
